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Abstract: Historically, every country had its own accounting standards, each merging
to some extent with its local corporate, labor, and tax laws. No matter how undesirable,
it was natural to expect differences among nations. Globalization made these
differences so impractical that from corporate leaders to accountants to government
officials, many pushed for harmonized accounting standards.
Pursuing this goal, a private international organization was created to set standards
for the world. Currently around 120 countries require or permit International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), however, the United States is yet to make a decision to
adopt these international standards.
The adoption of IFRS in the United States would, in theory, be easier compared to the
experience of the European Union. The EU mandated that all publicly traded firms use
IFRS in their consolidated financial statements from 2005 onwards. Several issues are
yet to be resolved, but Europe managed to achieve what was once thought to be an
insuperable task in coordinating a common standard for its Member States.
If the adoption of IFRS in the United States would be easier than the EU experience,
why has the United States not adopted IFRS? With this paper, I argue that IFRS are a
set of U.S. supported Anglo-American accounting standards. Further, that the reason
for creating IFRS was not necessarily for the United States to adopt them but to convert
the patchwork of accounting standards around the world into a single system that is
similar to U.S. GAAP.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A harmonized set of accounting standards has been a major step in the
process of integrating capital markets, however, half a century passed
without achieving the goal. 1 Historically, every country had its own
accounting standards, each merging to some extent with its local corporate,
labor, and tax laws. Even culture is said to affect national accounting
standards. 2 No matter how undesirable, it is natural to expect differences
among nations. This variance is sometimes described as a “chaotic
patchwork of diverging rules.” 3
As a consequence, corporate leaders, accountants, government officials,
and others worked to harmonize accounting standards to enable international
comparability of corporate financial statements. The International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was founded in 1973. The scope
of its role was to help “small developing countries with no accounting
standards of their own to develop accounting rules.” 4 Over time, however, it
transformed into the most powerful organization in the setting of
international accounting standards. By 2001, IASC renamed itself the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) of the International
Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS Foundation). It was
registered in the United States as a Delaware corporation.
In its rise to become the most influential organization of this type, the
IASB successfully deposed the United Nations (and other organizations) to
set standards in this domain. It became the premier organization setting
international accounting standards – at a time when many nations, stock
exchanges, and listed companies were striving for harmonization.
Approximately 120 countries now require or permit International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). 5 This figure will likely rise to 150 countries in
the near future. However, the United States is yet to decide whether to allow
or adopt IFRS for U.S. issuers. 6

1
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC’s Rise
to Global Influence, 1973-2001, 7(3) BUS. & POL., Dec. 2005, at 1 (this is article 3 within the issue, but
the articles are not consecutively paginated, so each article starts again at 1).
2
Neal F. Newman, The U.S. Move to International Accounting Standards – A Matter of Cultural
Discord – How do we Reconcile?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 835, 841 (2009).
3
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 1.
4
Id.
5
Throughout the paper, IFRS could mean a set of standards, a specific standard, or multiple standards.
Therefore, the use of is/are should not surprise the reader. Also, the use of “IFRS” for all should not be
confusing to the reader because which one is referred to will be obvious from the sentence.
6
See the IFRS Foundation’s website for which countries adopted IFRS for publicly traded firms. IFRS
Foundation, Jurisdiction Profiles, IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Pages/
Jurisdiction-profiles.aspx (last updated Aug. 30, 2016); Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International
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In an earlier paper with Martin Gelter, we argued that the adoption of
IFRS in the United States would, in theory, be easier compared to what was
required of the EU to harmonize their standards. 7 Both IFRS and U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) developed within
the Anglo-American accounting tradition, whereas, until the adoption of
IFRS, accounting in Europe had not. 8 Yet, a brave decision was made and a
major step was indeed taken when the EU Parliament approved the adoption
of IFRS: 9 the EU mandated that all publicly traded firms use IFRS in their
consolidated financial statements starting in 2005.10 There are several issues
yet to be resolved, but, all in all, Europe managed to achieve what was once
thought to be an insuperable task in coordinating and harmonizing the set of
standards for its Member States.
If the adoption of IFRS in the United States would, in principle, be much
easier than the EU experience, why has the United States not adopted IFRS?
The standard setters have been converging U.S. GAAP and IFRS for more
than a decade; however, the process has yet to come to an end. Further, there
is no consensus on whether it is beneficial for the United States to adopt
IFRS. Scholars researching the adoption of IFRS in the United States have
argued that IFRS are not a good fit for the United States because IFRS are
principles-based, whereas U.S. GAAP are rules-based, 11 or that they are not
a good cultural fit. 12 Others argued such an adoption would eliminate the
competition between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. 13 Still others argued that the

Accounting Standards Board, Prepared Remarks at Empire Club of Canada at the Toronto Conference 7
(Apr. 25, 2008), http://www.ifrs.org/News/Announcements-and-Speeches/Documents/Sir_David_
Tweedie_Empire_Club_Speech.pdf; see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting
Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2008).
7
Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics of Resistance
against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89 (2014).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Commission Regulation 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC) [hereinafter IAS Regulation]
(mandating all companies governed by the law of a Member State and listed on a regulated market in a
Member State to report their consolidated financial statements applying IFRS. The requirement applies to
Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA), which consists of the 27 EU Member States plus
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway).
11
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting
Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010); William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment
Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989 (2009).
12
See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2.
13
See, e.g., Shyam Sunder, IFRS Monopoly: The Pied Piper of Financial Reporting 41 ACCT. & BUS.
RES. 291 (2011); Shyam Sunder, IFRS and the Accounting Consensus, 23 ACCT. HORIZONS 101 (2009);
Karim Jamal & Shyam Sunder, Monopoly or Competition: Standard Setting in the Private and Public
Sector (Univ. Alberta Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 2013-1005, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075705;
Shyam Sunder, Uniform Financial Reporting Standards: Reconsidering the Top-Down Push, THE CPA
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not have the authority to
adopt the standards set by an international organization. 14 In sum, scholars
compared the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, or focused on the
fact that it is an international organization that sets the standards. None of
these arguments are convincing.
With this paper, I argue that IFRS is a set of U.S.-supported AngloAmerican accounting standards, and the reason for creating IFRS was to
convert the patchwork of accounting standards of multiple jurisdictions into
a single system that resembles U.S. GAAP. From its initiation, IFRS were
not necessarily designed for the U.S. listed companies to adopt them but for
the rest of the world to adopt a set of standards that resembles US GAAP. It
was clear that the world was not going to adopt U.S. GAAP as there has
always been resistance to any one country’s standards being chosen as the
world’s common denominator. 15 In light of this, I argue that the United
States, with its multiple actors and institutions – such as SEC and FASB –
successfully managed an international organization to conform to a set of
standards similar to U.S. GAAP.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II situates IFRS in the law and
economics discussion about mandatory disclosure, and the comparative
corporate governance literature. It reviews the patchwork of national
accounting standards used before the adoption of the IFRS and explains how
those differences were linked to diverging corporate governance regimes
around the world. It also evaluates whether the adoption of IFRS is signaling
the end of this divergence, or whether a capital market-oriented set of
standards can coexist with different corporate governance regimes. Part III
reviews the historical context (including the rise of multinationals and the
desire of stock exchanges to attract foreign issuers) and seeks to explain how
the IFRS Foundation became the standard-setter for the world. Part IV
envisions the direction of the IFRS Foundation and a possible SEC decision
on the adoption of IFRS for U.S. issuers.

J., Apr. 2007, at 6; Ronald Dye & Shyam Sunder, Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete
in the U.S.?, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 257 (2001).
14
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal
of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1, 28–33 (2008); Questions from Senator Carl Levin for Mary
Schapiro, Nominee to be Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission 4 (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/sec-and-governance/ShapiroResponsesTo
SenatorLevin012009.pdf (asking whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows “the SEC to delegate the
development of U.S. accounting standards to the IASB”); Jacob L. Barney, Note, Beyond Economics: The
U.S. Recognition of International Financial Reporting Standards as an International Subdelegation of the
SEC’s Rulemaking Authority, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (2009) (questioning the SEC’s authority
to recognize standard-setters besides FASB). But see Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)
(reaffirming the SEC's role in establishing accounting standards to be used by public companies).
15
Stephen Haswell & Jill Mckinnon, IASB Standards for Australia by 2005: Catapult or Trojan Horse,
13 AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 8, 8 (2003).
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II. THE PATCHWORK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
A. The Road Towards Mandatory Disclosure Regulation
Every company, big or small, listed or not, and located anywhere in the
world, produces some sort of financial report to better understand itself,
estimate its capabilities and, when necessary, inform outsiders of its profits
or losses. Beyond a basic desire to inform and understand of profits or losses,
financial reports help corporations do business with each other, build trust in
the market, evaluate themselves (in comparison to competitors), invest
capital, pay dividends, raise capital, and so on. Without a financial report, a
company has no direction, no mechanism for self-evaluation, and no basis to
compare itself with its competitors. That all companies voluntarily produce
some sort of a financial report is one of the universal characteristics of
corporations. Indeed, history’s oldest writing system, Sumerian cuneiform,
developed out of the accounting technology created by farmers of the Fertile
Crescent. 16 They used “simple shapes for accounting purposes, such as
recording numbers of sheep and amounts of grain” which developed into a
writing system. 17 Voluntary production of financial reports precedes the
development of a writing system itself.
Voluntary disclosure is no surprise. Nonlisted companies in the United
States, for instance, are not required to prepare financial reports in
compliance with U.S. GAAP, but they do so voluntarily– their creditors most
likely ask for them, or they would need these reports if they go public. When
this is the case even for nonlisted companies, there are more benefits when
listed companies voluntarily disclose financial reports. A Leftwich, Watts,
and Zimmerman study from 1981 revealed that managers exceed minimum
reporting requirements as “it is in the interest of the manager to provide these
reports voluntarily.” 18 Many corporations provided interim reports even in
the 1920s–before the establishment of the SEC. 19
Agency theory implies economic incentives for managers, such as good
reputation, as reporting profits ultimately enhances compensation of the
managers. 20 Voluntary disclosure plays a critical role for firms when

16

JARED DIAMOND, GUNS GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 218 (1999).
Id.
18
Richard W. Leftwich, Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Voluntary Corporate Disclosure:
The Case of Interim Reporting, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 50, 51, 57 (1981).
19
Id. at 51.
20
Ross L. Watts, Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Political Processes,
4 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 1, 4–8 (1977); HARRY I. WOLK, JAMES L. DODD & JOHN J. ROZYCKI, ACCOUNTING
THEORY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 90–91 (7th ed. 2008); see
17
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competing to raise capital in markets where limited capital is available. 21
Voluntary disclosure also serves to enhance monitoring as many information
asymmetries among investors are eliminated by making financial reports
available in the public domain. 22 Disclosure may ultimately decrease the cost
of capital and increase firm value. 23
Each firm’s disclosure, in the aggregate, makes it easier for investors to
evaluate and compare firms, “lower the estimation risk" 24 and “eliminate
duplicative efforts of information intermediaries and investors.” 25 Yet, it gets
more complicated when negative effects and firm-specific costs are
considered. Preparation and dissemination of the financial reports are direct
costs and can be substantial, to say nothing of indirect costs. 26 For instance,
the information provided to raise capital may be used by competitors (i.e.,
profitability of a specific business), employees (including the managing team
when calculating bonuses) or tax authorities. 27
Just as firms that disclose more information can attract investors to the
detriment of their competitors, the same is true for competition among capital
markets. Leuz and Wysocki explain “high transparency in one capital market
can siphon off investors and lower the price efficiency in other capital
markets.” 28 This could explain why NYSE is the largest stock market in the
world by market capitalization–its value is more than the next three
combined. 29 However, misreporting activities “have negative spillovers to
related firms, governments, and investors,” and can cause marketwide
negative effects. 30 Such a marketwide effect was seen in the Enron and
WorldCom examples. 31

also Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 56–59.
21
This is called signaling theory. See ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMANN, POSITIVE
ACCOUNTING THEORY 156, 163–66, 168 (1985); see also WOLK ET AL. supra note 20, at 91.
22
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure
Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (UNIV. CHI. & MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT.,
Working Paper No. 1, 2008), at 6; WOLK ET AL. supra note 20, at 91; Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman,
supra note 18, at 58.
23
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 29.
24
Id. at 12.
25
Id. at 12–13; see also John Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
26
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 10–11.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 13.
29
Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 117.
30
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22 at 13–14; see also J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions:
The Worldcom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 207 (2003).
31
See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006) (investigating how WorldCom and Enron occurred and analyzing gatekeepers’ role
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Cost-benefit analysis tells us that financial reporting and disclosure have
many firm-specific and marketwide benefits; thus, that firms voluntarily
disclose some information is no surprise. However, the optimal level of
disclosure to raise capital while avoiding the aforementioned costs is unique
to each firm, and would vary from company to company in the absence of a
common standard. 32 This dynamic gives rise to question of whether
voluntary disclosure is desirable and sufficient both for firms and the market,
or whether requiring and regulating disclosure will better serve those
interests. 33
It has been argued that “anyone who genuinely desires information
about a firm can obtain it” by privately contracting with someone with access
to it (i.e., the firm itself, stock analysts, etc.). 34 Yet, it would be prohibitively
costly and inefficient if firms bargained for the information to be provided to
its shareholders, debt holders, employees, customers, and suppliers at the
start of each contract negotiation. 35 This inefficiency would multiply when
these stakeholders sought to compare the disclosures with information
provided by other companies (and, particularly if the credibility and
reliability with voluntary disclosure is in question).
As Coffee explains, in a capital market-oriented system, voluntary
disclosure will not be reliable when one considers agency costs as it may be
“sheltering opportunistic managerial behavior.” 36 Voluntary disclosure
would enable managers to withhold critical information or disclose some the
way they prefer and at a time they see it beneficial. When, for instance,
managers oppose a takeover, voluntary disclosure would help managers
delay the downward adjustment in stock price. 37 Thus, mandatory disclosure

in those incidents); see also Sidak supra note 30 (arguing WorldCom's fraud had real negative effects on
other telecom firms, governments and capital markets); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the
Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1127, 1138 &
note 29 (2003) (“as demonstrated by widespread market reaction to the problems at Enron, a disclosure
regime that is seen as permitting the inflation of financial results adds systematic risk.”); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some
Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003), William W. Bratton,
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
32
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 14.
33
Id. at 4–10; see also Robert E. Verrecchia, Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure, 12 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 365 (1990).
34
WOLK ET AL. supra note 20, at 93.
35
See, e.g., id. at 94 (defining this as a “waste of resources for everyone to be buying the same private
information about the firms.”); see also Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 59–60.
36
Coffee, supra note 25, at 747.
37
Id.
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seems to be a healthier way to respond to such problems. 38
From negotiating disclosures to comparability, from limiting the private
benefits of controlling insiders to providing ease of access to capital markets,
bank loans, and investment alternatives for investors, regulation has various
marketwide and firm-level cost savings. 39 Mandatory disclosure could be
optimal even for creditors such as banks, as they will find it more reliable
and efficient to gather information relying on a standardized set of disclosure
rules. Regulation provides unification over implementation, enforcement,
and sanctioning in a way that is cheaper and more efficient than voluntary
disclosure. 40 In addition, mandatory disclosure regulations ensure the
reliability and accessibility that allows financial markets to flourish. A
philosophical justification is that in an “open and democratic society,”
regulating disclosure would be the reasonable road to constant improvement
of accounting standards. 41
Finally, the concept of information as a public good plays a critical role
for financial reporting standards, financial accounting information provided
in the capital markets, and information from non-issuer sources (such as
information provided by securities analysts.) 42 There are two main reasons
why these are seen as public goods. First, one can access and use accounting
standards, financial reports, and the securities analyst reports without paying
for them. 43 Second, the value of these goods does not diminish with usage,

38

Id.
Rene M. Stulz, Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial
Globalization, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 347, 377–83 (2009) (showing that mandatory disclosure and enforcement
decrease agency costs and impact investment decisions and welfare of a country); Leuz & Wysocki, supra
note 22, at 18–22; Christian Leuz, Different Approaches to Corporate Reporting Regulation: How
Jurisdictions Differ and Why, 40 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 229, 231 (2010); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 279 (2d ed. 2009); WOLK ET AL. supra note 20, at 94–98.
40
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 14–17.
41
WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 94, 99 (“the focus of accounting regulation is not on mandatory
reporting per se; it is on improving the quality of reported information.”).
42
WATTS & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 21, at 164–65, 167; Coffee, supra note 25, at 722, 725–26.
43
Coffee, supra note 25, at 725–26. This is called non-excludability which brings up the free-riding
problem. As to free-riders problem for accounting standards, think about the nonlisted companies using
U.S. GAAP in spite of the fact that these standards are designed for listed companies and with capital
markets in mind. Also note, even many listed companies were free riders until the Sarbanes Oxley Act as
not all listed companies were contributing to the standard setters. Listed companies started to pay an
annual accounting support fee to the SEC and these funds in turn are being transferred to FASB after
approval of their annual budget by the SEC. Yet, such a funding/general fee payment to the SEC is not a
direct payment in return to the standards used by those companies and thus accounting standards can still
be categorized as public good in which uses do not directly pay for it. See Sarbanes Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7219 (2010); see also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING
SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: FINAL STAFF REPORT (July 13, 2012) [hereinafter SEC FINAL STAFF PAPER,
39
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regardless of whether they are available for, and used by, others. 44 However,
if public goods are unregulated, they tend to be underprovided–due to
externalities. Moreover, these circumstances suggest the presence of free
riders and the inability to charge all users.45 Regulation and standardization
improves efficiency (and lowers cost) by providing a basis from which to
validate information for accuracy. 46 For this reason, mandatory regulation is
viewed as the best alternative in the case of disclosure of financial
information in the capital markets. There is widespread agreement that
regulation is beneficial for the development of financial markets. 47
With the acknowledgment that mandatory disclosure is more beneficial
than a voluntary regime, the discussion turns to who will regulate. One
country may choose a private standard-setter to regulate, while another might
envision disclosure requirements as the product of a formal legislative
process–and would not allow it to remain in the hands of private parties.
Some would prefer a public agency to enforce the rules, while others may
find such an agency cumbersome and inefficient. Further, there may be
regulation at the country level, state level, or exchange level. Yet, as new
trends show, standard setting could also occur at the international level,
unifying the disclosure regulations of adopting countries and increasing
network effects. 48
Choosing among the aforementioned alternatives, and accounting
regulation itself, is a political activity. 49 It is not possible, even for regulators,
to determine the optimal level of disclosure. 50 To further complicate the
political process of regulation is the potential presence of regulators who may
be incompetent, corrupt, or captured by the industry to be regulated. 51
Moreover, regulation in accounting affects income and wealth distribution
and will be “benefitting one group at the expense of another.” 52 As Perry and
Nölke put it,
Resolution of social conflict over resources is not simply recorded by
accounting after the event; rather, accounting numbers themselves

July 13, 2012.]; Cunningham, supra note 6, at 27.
44
Coffee, supra note 25, at 725 (giving public goods examples such as public parks and public
television); WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 96 (giving the example of highways and National Public
Radio).
45
Coffee, supra note 25, at 722, 726; WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 96.
46
Coffee, supra note 25, at 722, 726.
47
Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 439, 442 (2005).
48
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 21–22.
49
See e.g., WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 101–07.
50
Id.; Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 16.
51
See e.g., Shleifer, supra note 47, at 440–41.
52
Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 22, at 16.
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form the basis for such resolutions. Accounting impacts the lives of
everyone in the society, even (or perhaps especially) those who know
very little about the subject and have never set eyes on a financial
statement. 53

In light of these considerations, mandatory disclosure is the subject of
political decisions rather than an outcome of a pure economic analysis. 54
B. Divergent Financial Accounting Systems Until the Worldwide
Adoption of IFRS
Economic analysis is inevitable where governments or private actors set
accounting standards, yet a purely economic analysis may not reveal the
underlying reasons of a chosen set of standards. Almost every nation had its
own accounting system until the worldwide adoption of IFRS, because
accounting was seen as a national matter. To the extent markets were closed,
there was no necessity to understand other counties’ accounting standards
nor was there a desire to look at the financial reports of companies located in
other countries. At the national level, it was—and it still is—mandatory to
have some sort of financial reports for some or all companies incorporated in
that jurisdiction, but these financial reports were (and still are) not necessarily
used for the same purpose or prepared for the same audience. Nor the
standards or the standard setters resembled one another.
In some countries, financial accounting has been closely connected to
tax accounting, which is why standard-setting has sometimes been seen as a
legislative task. In such countries, accounting has been regulated as part of
their company law and tax law. In other countries, however, tax accounting
and financial accounting are separate; in this case, private actors, such as a
group of experts, generally set financial reporting standards.
This patchwork has been fading away, to some extent, as more countries
adopt IFRS for public firms. But does it really mean that the world of
financial accounting is now harmonized for listed companies no matter where
they trade? It is important at this point to note that most countries are
adopting IFRS for publicly traded firms, not necessarily for small or
nonlisted ones. The EU for instance, has mandated IFRS since 2005, but only
for consolidated accounts of listed companies. 55 Company level accounts and
nonlisted companies fall under national accounting laws—at least so long as
the Member State does not require or permit IFRS for other accounts. 56

53
James Perry & Andreas Nölke, The Political Economy of International Accounting Standards, 13
REV. INT’L. POL. ECON. 559, 560 (2006).
54
WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 101.
55
Id.
56
See e.g., Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 96, 153–56.
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With the trend to harmonize accounting standards across nations, the
question becomes whether all companies should be viewed the same way
when it comes to disclosure, or should various corporate governance regimes
be taken into account (and have companies disclose differently)? In other
words, does it make sense to treat all companies the same for accounting
purposes? Recent developments allow us to answer a portion of this question,
as public firms are already treated differently. IFRS are not designed for
small or nonlisted companies–IASB promulgated separate standards for
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) called “IFRS for SMEs”;
however, these are at an early stage in terms of adoption, compared to IFRS. 57
However, the question goes beyond an SMEs versus multinationals
discussion. Should divergent corporate governance regimes be taken into
account, or should they be disregarded under the assumption that IFRS are
right for all public firms–no matter where they are located and irrespective
of their governance structure?
1. Differences Among National Economies
The existence of financial markets depends on accessible and
trustworthy information. 58 Mandatory disclosure is essential for capital
markets and is beneficial both for listed companies and investors in capital
markets. Yet, not all national financial systems are capital market-oriented.
When it comes to capital market-oriented regimes, the world closely watches
U.S. capital markets. However, others argue to discredit it. Among those,
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz point to a record number of foreign companies
delisting from U.S. capital markets and argue that the U.S. capital markets
have a “listing gap” (meaning they do not have as many listed companies as
they should.) 59 Nevertheless, the United States, with NYSE and NASDAQ,
has the largest capital market in the world by market capitalization. The
United States is followed by the UK, Japan, and China, but the size of all

57
IFRS Foundation, About the IFRS for SMEs, IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/IFRS-forSMEs/Pages/IFRS-for-SMEs.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). Among the most recent adopters of IFRS
for SMEs are relatively small sized countries such as Kosovo and Uruguay. SMEs in both countries are
required to use the IFRS for SMEs starting January 1, 2015. For Kosovo, see IFRS Foundation, IFRS for
SMEs Update, IFRS.ORG (Apr. 2015), http://media.ifrs.org/2015/SME/April/IFRS%20for%20SMEs%20
UpdateApril%202015v2.pdf. For Uruguay, see IFRS Foundation, IFRS for SMEs Update, IFRS.ORG (Jan.
2015), http://media.ifrs.org/2015/SME/January/IFRS-for-SMEs-Update-January-2015.pdf.
58
Katharina Pistor, Rethinking the "Law and Finance" Paradigm, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1647, 1651.
59
See e.g., Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap (Fisher C. Bus.,
Working Paper No. 2015-03-07, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605000 (on listing gap); see also Craig
Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets? 65 J.
FIN. 1507, 1507–08, 1512 (2010) (on foreign company delistings).
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three of the latter combined does not match the size of the U.S. capital
market.
Aside from a handful of developed capital markets across the globe,
however, the majority of countries do not have developed capital markets.
Many countries were not interested in developing capital markets until the
1990s. Academics have examined the underlying reasons for capital markets
to operate less well in certain countries. In a series of papers, LLS et al.,
linked it to “good” or “bad” corporate laws.60 In those papers, LLS et al.
argued that financial development is linked to “legal origin” such as common
law versus civil law, and concluded that common law rules are more market
friendly and thus superior, while French civil law rules are the least
desirable. 61
The World Bank, the IMF, and the very countries these academics
researched, used these studies to push for better-functioning capital markets
and changing laws to resemble the capital market-oriented systems. 62 At the
same time, globalization increased the ease of investing in capital markets
internationally–with just clicks from a computer with an internet connection.
These forces started to change the classical understanding of competition

60
LLS et al. refers to Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and their coauthors in different papers such as Robert Vishny, and Simeon Djankov.
61
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998); Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003); Rafael La Porta et al.,
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
62
La Porta et al. (2008), supra note 61, at 325 (“the data collection project has made substantial strides
through a World Bank Doing Business initiative, which assembles and updates much of the information
on laws and regulations discussed in this paper”); Fauvarque-Cosson & Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic
Contest, French Reactions to Doing Business and Economic-Analysis of Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811,
820 (2009) (“Although it initially appeared to be scientific in nature, the aim behind the study emerged to
be a biased promotion of common law countries to conquer the law market at the expense of the other
great legal family, referred to as the French civil law tradition in the reports.”); id. at 823 (“their methods,
their questionnaires, and modification of certain indicators. Because they were drafted by economists and
because the greatest influence in economics emanates from the United States, these questionnaires
appeared skewed in favor of the common law from the start.”); Ronald J. Gilson, Catalysing Corporate
Governance: The Evolution of the United States System in the 1980s and 1990s, 24 COMPANY & SEC. L.J.
143, 143 (2006) (“By the close of the 1990s, the United States corporate governance system . . . was
treated as the end point in the burgeoning convergence literature and was the template for the reform
efforts of major NGOs, like the World Bank, the OECD and the International Monetary Fund”); Maria
Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession (Stan. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 470, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2491088; see generally Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and
Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43 (2009) (“develop insights gained from comparative law
and legal theory to challenge the World Bank project's theoretical assumptions, pointing out its
methodological flaws and showing its potentially misleading recommendations for legal reform.”);
Catherine Valcke, The French Response To The World Bank’s Doing Business Reports, 60 U. TORONTO
L.J. 197 (2010).
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among countries to attract such investors, and the way corporations seek
financing.
When LLS et al. argued that common law provided better investor
protection rights and better property rights, and thus is a better fit for financial
development, international organizations, especially the World Bank, started
to develop policies that advised the creation of institutions and the
implementation of laws that resembled those of common law economies. 63
However, the IMF and the World Bank seemed to disregard the harsh
criticism LLS et al. faced since the publication of their original paper, Law
and Finance. 64 In that paper, LLS et al. linked the development of stock
markets to firm level investor protection, focusing on corporate law and then
on securities law, but never banking law, which itself suggests a preference
for capital market-oriented financial systems. 65 Moreover, developments in
the law generally follow economic developments, as it grows to address new
situations or react to crises. 66 However, LLS et al. treated the presence of

63
WORLDBANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004) (subsequent annual
reports can also be reviewed); see e.g., Pistor, supra note 58, at 1656–57 (“The failure to explain the link
between legal origin and specific legal institutions is particularly disconcerting when this framework is
used for policy purposes. After all, most of the LLS et al. studies were sponsored by the World Bank and
the World Bank has used the indicators for assessing countries’ legal systems and to motivate policy
advice (Doing Business Project).”). Interestingly, even Wikipedia mentions La Porta et al. at their page
on the Doing Business Report. Ease of Doing Business Index, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Ease_of_doing_business_index#Doing_Business_Report (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“The Doing
Business Report has its origins in a paper first published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics by Simeon
Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer called ‘The Regulation of
Entry’ in 2002.”).
64
Even further, they seem to have disregarded the criticism about their policies relying on the research
of La Porta et al. See generally Pistor, supra note 58. For further articles with a criticism towards the
World Bank’s Doing Business Reports, see supra note 62.
65
Pistor, supra note 58, at 1651 (citing Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006)).
66
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial
Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 25 (2014) (“foundational financial legislation tends to be enacted in
a crisis setting”); Roberta Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation A
Postscript to Regulating in the Dark (Euro. Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 273, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517853, (“[T]here is a systemic pattern in major U.S. financial regulation: (i)
enactment is invariably crisis driven . . . .”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523–29 (2005) (explaining the aftermath of Enron
and others and how high profile corporate scandals pawed the way for the enactment of SOX); id. at 1528
(“SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media
frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases”); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1780
(2011) ("In response to public outrage prompted by stock market losses and seemingly rampant fraud,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”); Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron and Beyond:
Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure Regimes, 37
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particular laws as a precondition of economic development. 67 Securities law
in the United States, for instance, is a response to the Great Depression; the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act came only after the Enron scandal; and the Dodd-Frank
Act could have never been enacted if the 2008 financial crisis had not
occurred. 68
In addition, in today’s complex world where various laws were
transplanted into national legal systems and influenced by multiple
economies at different times, it is not black or white to determine a country’s
“legal origin.” 69 Siems, for instance, points out the difference between
transplanted and origin economies and criticizes the arbitrary way LLS et al.
determine countries’ legal origin. 70 For instance, Lithuania belongs to the
French legal family whereas Latvia, together with China and Japan, belongs
to the German legal family. 71 Also, Armour & Lele show how making a
judgment on the basis of legal origin can mislead, such as an assumption that
Indian laws are ‘good’ because of their common law origin. 72
Both Roe and Coffee have collected historical evidence and shown that
neither “legal origin” nor “rules that provide better investor protection” boost
national economies, noting various reasons why countries have different

CONN. L. REV. 725, 745 (2005) (“[T]he main thrust of post-Enron reform has been to establish a stronger
regime for the oversight of auditors and of the auditing process. This has been led by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act . . . .”); id. at 759 (“Sarbanes-Oxley can be seen as a reactive measure that sought to ‘plug’ the gaps
in corporate governance systems and accounting and auditing practices that were identified as key to the
Enron crisis.”); Gerald F. Seib, The President’s Agenda: Rahm Emanuel Discusses What He Expect to
Pass (Everything), WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, R 10 (citing President Barak Obama’s chief of staff, Rahm
Emanuel, saying “never let a serious crisis go to waste”).
In line with regulating after the crisis, Romano tells how, in the absence of the crisis, the legislative
process will slow down. Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 229, 233 (2009) (“Notwithstanding a slow-moving legislative process in the absence of the crisis
environment that gave rise to SOX, the widespread criticism of SOX has had a discernible effect, causing
the SEC to revisit its implementation in order to take preemptive action that could deflect and drain the
energy behind efforts by Congress and business interest groups to revamp the legislation.").
67
Pistor, supra note 58, at 1653–54; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles
of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control 111 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (“Much
historical evidence suggests that legal developments have tended to follow, rather than precede, economic
change”).
68
See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Coffee, supra note 67, at 24–39 (giving historical
examples from the U.S. experience on how U.S. laws followed the economic change.).
69
Pistor, supra note 58, at 1652–54; see Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law &
Finance and Comparative Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007).
70
Siems, supra note 69, at 65.
71
Id.
72
See e.g., John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India, 43 L. & SOC.
REV. 491, 491 (2008) (“[P]olitical economy explanations have more traction in explaining the case of
India than do theories based on ‘legal origins.’”).
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legal origins. 73 Economic choices cannot possibly lead to the desired
outcome if national differences are disregarded. To better understand how
and why capital markets evolved in common law countries but not in
Continental Europe, there is a need for further consideration of politics and
the different needs that arose after World War I and II; moreover, the effects
of colonization on both origin and transplanted economies need to be
evaluated.74
When Hall and Soskice’s pathbreaking work Varieties of Capitalism
came out, the differences among developed economies became clearer and,
more importantly, it became evident that there is more than one path to
economic success. 75 Paralleling the civil law vs common law discussion of
LLS et al., Hall & Soskice distinguish between coordinated market
economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs), with LMEs being
common law countries and CMEs being civil law countries. 76 They do not
claim one economy’s superiority but examine the institutional
complementarities and show comparative institutional advantages of each
type of economy. 77 After all, “each system produces its own costs and
benefits in economic, social, and political terms, and the relative costs and
benefits may change over time.” 78 Since more and more scholars agree that
there is no single recipe for economic success, one would suspect that

73
See Coffee, supra note 67; Siems, supra note 69; Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern
Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (arguing that ownership structures and the depth of stock
markets across economies are divergent because of the different political goals of the nations, not by the
legal origins.).
74
See generally Coffee, supra note 67; Roe, supra note 73.
75
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); see also Chris Howell, Varieties of Capitalism - And Then
There Was One?, 36 COMP. POL. 103, 107 (2003) (book review) (“Countries have different sets of
institutions to manage such coordination problems as accessing capital, motivating employees, ensuring
appropriate skill levels, and bargaining over wages. No one set has obvious advantages that are consistent
over time and across all productive activities. The data presented on economic performance do not show
one cluster of countries, the liberal market economies for example, as consistently outperforming another.
Rather, each interlocking institutional set does different things with different degrees of success.”).
76
See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND
THE U.S. 249, 249–52 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 2005).
77
See e.g., Howell, supra note 75, at 106. (“a crucial part of the theoretical framework of Varieties of
Capitalism is the specification of two ideal-types, liberal market economies and coordinated market
economies, each with a distinctive set of institutions that solves the coordination problems of firms in
quite different ways.”). For a detailed explanation of institutional complementarities, see Peter A. Hall &
David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARITIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 75, at
17–18 (“The returns from a stock market trading in corporate securities, for instance, may be increased
by regulations mandating a fuller exchange of information about companies.”).
78
Pistor, supra note 76, at 249.
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different varieties of capitalism would necessitate different varieties of
accounting standards. But, as the next Part shows, varieties of accounting
standards are fading away in the name of harmonization and for the sake of
global comparability. 79
From a comparative corporate law perspective, however, it is
problematic to assume that a capital market-oriented system or any one
system would be the best choice for the world, irrespective of how
corporations function in that specific economy, and how interrelated
institutions operate therein. No matter how global the world is, locality is still
an important aspect for every corporation. 80 Put differently, a German
company might seek ways to raise capital and thus decide to be listed in the
NYSE, yet this does not change the fact that the company is German and it
may well maintain German characteristics such as employee representation
on its boards in a way that would not be normal for a Delaware corporation
in the United States. 81
The same is true with a companies’ percentage of listed shares in any
exchange. It is not surprising to see, for instance, an Italian listed company
controlled by a single shareholder or a family holding the majority of the
shares of a listed firm. The fact that an Italian firm is listed does not transform
its structure into dispersed ownership, nor does it change the way it is
controlled. Therefore, it is not clear why, via the mandatory usage of IFRS,
all listed companies should be treated as if they have a dispersed ownership
structure and a shareholder primacy feature as the main goal of financial
reporting.
It is necessary to understand corporate structures around the world
before one can focus on whether setting financial reporting standards rooted
in the classical Berle-Means corporation (dispersed ownership structure
allowing the separation of ownership and control) would be beneficial all
around the world. More precisely, it is crucial to understand whether such
standard setting would be beneficial even for economies with concentrated
ownership (where there is agency conflict between controlling and minority

79
See e.g., Yuan Ding, Jacques Richard & Herve Stolowy, Towards an Understanding of the Phases
of Goodwill Accounting in Four Western Capitalist Countries: From Stakeholder Model to Shareholder
Model, 33 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 718 (2008) (making such a point about goodwill accounting).
80
See, e.g., Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe–Accountability and
Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 302 (2013) (“The overall result is an unstable balance between
convergence and divergence, shareholder and stakeholder influence, as well as European v. national
rulemaking.”).
81
See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129 (2009).
Moreover, even if there are some German companies interested in cross-listing, a bulk of German
companies, especially the small and medium-size enterprises most likely have no such interest.
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shareholders), and for economies where other stakeholders (such as banks,
states, and employees) have a stronger voice compared to their counterparts
in capital market-oriented systems.
When corporate governance structures are not the same, but the same
standard is implemented, the outcome might well be different. For this
reason, implementation incentives need to be different for dispersed
ownership and concentrated ownership, which implies a difference in the
IFRS practice across corporate governance regimes. For example, in
dispersed ownership, shareholders often rely on financial reports where
incentives for the implementation of IFRS would arguably be higher. Yet,
increasing disclosure requirements and higher standards for transparency will
diminish private benefits of control and a decrease in managerial discretion
that may not be what a board of directors would want. 82 In other words, in
countries with dispersed ownership, investors would want IFRS
implementation, while some managers may oppose due to the fact that
corporate managers in dispersed ownership may engage in “earnings
manipulation.” 83
An analogous argument could be for outside investors versus
controlling shareholders in a concentrated ownership where outside investors

82
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (2000) (explaining the differences among
countries in ownership structures by looking at “how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are
protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms.”); see also
Hollis Ashbaugh, Non-U.S. Firms' Accounting Standard Choices, 20 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y. 129, 130–
32, 149–150 (2001) (finding that firms are more likely to use IAS when they will issue additional shares
of stock and when their shares trade in more foreign equity markets. Ashbaugh defines this as firms
attempt to lower information asymmetry component of their cost of capital); Hollis Ashbaugh & Morton
Pincus, Domestic Accounting Standards, International Accounting Standards, and the Predictability of
Earnings, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 417, 417 (2001) (“IAS are a set of financial reporting policies that typically
require increased disclosure and restrict management's choices of measurement methods relative to the
accounting standards.”); id. at 419 (“We posit that IAS adoption is part of a concerted effort by managers
to satisfy the increased demand for information that typically occurs as firms issue additional equity.”);
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN.
537, 537–40, 575 (2004) (stating that the degree of accounting disclosure allows minority shareholders to
identify abuses.); Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller & Rene M. Stulz,
Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision, 64 J. FIN. 425, 426, 432 (2009);
Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate
Governance?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2007) (investigating how governance and disclosure are related to firm
characteristics); Lin Peng & Ailsa Roell, Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation, 69 J. FIN.
487 (2014) (on managers’ capability to manipulate and how corporate governance and disclosure can
help); see generally Gunter Storbl, Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 449
(2013).
83
Looking at scandals such as Enron and WorldCom would tell us much about it and Coffee names
these two as “iconic examples” of fraud in dispersed ownership regimes. John C. Coffee, A Theory of
Corporate Scandals: Why The USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198, 199 (2005).
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want IFRS implementation while some controlling shareholders oppose it. In
countries with dispersed ownership disclosure requirements, one should
arguably find more supporters as the pool would include almost all
shareholders, whereas in concentrated ownership, supporters would be
limited to minority shareholders. As this example shows, IFRS may be
effective when the governance structure of a company is dispersed
ownership; however, this will not be the case in every country because
private benefits of control are smaller in countries with extensive investor
protection. 84 Also, it has been argued that the reduction in private benefits
after IFRS adoption is larger in countries with weak investor protection
where company insiders have a higher cost of adopting IFRS. 85
Looking at the current approach in the global accounting standard
setting process for IFRS, the focus is not on the differences among
corporations in different economies. Instead, IASB looks at firms from a
capital market-oriented perspective, calling it “global.” Such a perspective
assumes that these differences are more or less like the “variation in corporate
strategies inside all economies.” 86 In spite of raised concerns and widespread
warnings from academia arguing that harmonizing accounting standards
would not necessarily stop the implementation disparities among nations, 87
the current approach is not focused on whether, for instance, European
economies or East Asian countries are capital market-oriented or not. Instead,
for IFRS, it seems to matter whether financial reports will be prepared by a
listed company or a nonlisted one. Interestingly, if the company is nonlisted,
which set of standards they are expected to use is not clear. Since there is a
set of standards for small or medium size enterprises (SMEs) one might argue

84
See, e.g., Annelies Renders & Ann Gaeremynck, The Impact of Legal and Voluntary Investor
Protection On the Early Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 155 DE
ECONOMIST 49, 49–52 (2007); Dyck & Zingales, supra note 82, at 538–41, 589–90.
85
Renders & Gaeremynck, supra note 84, at 49–52.
86
VARITIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 75, at 15.
87
For an excellent article on why disparities will continue, see Christian Leuz, Different Approaches
to Corporate Reporting Regulation: How Jurisdictions Differ and Why, 40 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 229 (2010)
(showing the complementarities among countries’ institutions and persistent enforcement differences
around the world. Argues “that reporting practices are unlikely to converge globally, despite efforts to
harmonize reporting standards.”). See also Holger Daske, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, & Rodrigo Verdi,
Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions, 51 J. ACCT.
RES. 495, 495–500 (2013) (showing “firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new
standards”); Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes
in Enforcement, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 147, 147–150 (2013) (looking at the jurisdictions that adopted IFRS
and this adoption’s impact on liquidity, they find that changes in reporting enforcement play a critical role
rather than IFRS adoption); CHRISTOPHER NOBES & ROBERT PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTING, 161 (12th ed. 2008); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmermann, Towards a Positive Theory
of the Determination of Accounting Standards, 53 ACCT. REV. 112 (1978).
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that if it is nonlisted, then it is a SME. Yet, there are nonlisted giants that are
definitely neither small- nor medium-sized. A classification assuming all
listed companies should be treated equally is problematic and assumes that
investors would want them all to produce financial reports under equal terms
no matter how different they are. In addition, putting all nonlisted firms
together in a different league–no matter how big they are–appears to be
equally problematic.
At times, scholars argue that the Anglo-American model, i.e. the
shareholder-oriented model, will eventually prevail.88 Even when writing
“End of History for Corporate Law” over a decade ago, Hansmann &
Kraakman saw the upcoming worldwide adoption of international accounting
standards as an example of legal convergence to the shareholder-oriented
model. 89 The developments since then (such as increased state ownership in
some countries 90 and the dominance of institutional investors 91) imply that

88

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001).
Id. at 439, 455–57, 465–66.
90
In spite of all the privatization of state-owned entities (SOEs) that took place towards the end of the
twentieth century, SOEs are still major players in the corporate world. While in some countries such as
China, SOEs were and still are inevitable, in other countries such as India and Brazil, state ownership
seems to be rising. See, e.g., Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland,
State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, 147 OECD TRADE POL’Y PAPERS 1, 5–
6 (2013) (emphasis added) (“Among the emerging countries considered in this paper, state presence in
the economy remains significant, and has in some cases even increased in recent years. . . . Of the 2000
largest companies, 204 have been identified as majority SOEs in the business year 2010-2011 with
ownership spread across 37 different countries. The numbers vary significantly by country, with China
leading the list (70 SOEs), followed by India (30), Russia (9), the United Arab Emirates (9) and Malaysia
(8). The combined sales of the 204 SOEs amount to USD 3.6 trillion in the business year 2010-2011,
representing more than 10% of the aggregate sales of the 2000 largest companies and exceeding the 2010
Gross National Incomes (GNIs) of countries like the UK, France or Germany. The value of sales (USD
327 billion) of these SOEs is equivalent to almost 6% of world GDP. Their combined market value (USD
4.9 trillion) corresponds to 11% of global market capitalisation of all listed companies. China, the United
Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, Norway and Thailand are the ten
countries with the highest Country SOE Shares. . . .”); see also Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and
Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2917 (2012) (emphasis added) (“State ownership of
publicly traded corporations remains pervasive around the world and has been increasing in recent
years.”).
91
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013) (“Equity ownership in
the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm.
Instead, we observe the reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investment
intermediarie”); see infra note 103 and accompanying text; Stulz, supra note 39, at 365 (“throughout the
world, the growing importance of institutional investors and the increasing ease with which pools of funds
from these investors can be assembled make private solutions easier as firms can choose to bypass the
public markets and use private equity financing with contractual arrangements”); William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 145 (2008) (“Institutional shareholders emerged as active governance
89
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there will not be one winning model, though there has been a tendency
toward such a model among some firms. More precisely, these are firms that
go public, still need to raise more capital, and go global (and cross-list) to
raise that capital. Yet, the question is still valid: Does the fact that some
public firms are being cross-listed in multiple jurisdictions and have a
tendency towards a more dispersed ownership structure mean that it will be
the case for all firms? Should we see the worldwide adoption of IFRS as a
means of designing a capital market-oriented system for the world?
2. Different Accounting Systems in Different Economies
As Cunningham puts it, “[the] goal of any accounting standard is to treat
like companies and transactions alike and to treat different companies and
different transactions differently. The purpose of these treatments is to
provide comparability, meaning that users of financial statements can readily
compare the performance of alternative businesses.”92 But what if we are
treating different companies alike via IFRS?
The Anglo-American way of financial reporting did not dominate until
the widespread adoption of IFRS. However, cross listed firms were
publishing multiple sets of financial reports for the same year/quarter, each
set with different standards and having different numbers for the same year,
which was complicating the process. U.S. capital markets, meanwhile, were
looking for ways to expand and reach investors and companies beyond North
America. By then, corporations from various jurisdictions were also
envisioning access to the world’s capital markets to raise more capital.93
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union has long offered
new elements to almost every aspect of the daily lives of Europeans. From
the new currency to the new court of the EU, people gradually adapted to an
increasingly harmonized region. The new, harmonized rules also offered a
new way to establish a company—an EU company. 94 In addition, new laws
facilitated business throughout Europe irrespective of which Member State
the companies are incorporated in. 95 Freedom of establishment, among the

players, disrupting power relationships.”).
92
Cunningham, supra note 6, at 7.
93
See infra Part III.C.1.
94
See, e.g., Martin Gelter, Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies, and the Court's
Accidental Vision for Corporate Law 2 (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 287, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564765http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=2564765.
95
Id. (“In the three cases [Centros (1999), Überseering (2002), and Inspire Art (2003)], a Member
State refused the recognition of a firm set up in another Member State, or attempted to apply some of its
laws to it. In each case, the ECJ found the host State to be in violation of the freedom of establishment. . . .
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core features of the EU, was “necessary for shareholders as well as third
parties interacting with corporations, such as creditors and contracting
parties, to be able to rely on a certain level of minimum standards.” 96 After
these developments, it became easier for a UK company, for instance, to do
business in Belgium. As third parties from one Member State interacted with
companies incorporated in another, it was reasonable to think of harmonizing
the accounting standards these companies were bound by.
Harmonizing accounting rules had been on the EU agenda, as there were
substantial benefits. Yet there was no one set of standards that all EU
members would agree upon. Europe had a strong desire to harmonize
accounting standards across Member States, but there was no strong or
feasible option originating in Europe. Germany, for instance, were not going
to adopt French accounting, and France would not adopt German accounting
(and the British would not even consider either).97
The EU’s Fourth and the Seventh Directives tried to harmonize
accounting across Europe but were not successful. However, something
“international” seemed to be the ideal solution because many European
companies were interested in raising capital outside of Europe. 98 Of course
that cannot be the only reason for the EU to adopt IFRS. The compelling
reason was that IFRS offered an international setting that was more appealing
than what accounting standards of Continental Europe, mainly the German
one, could offer. While Continental European standards were not useful for
capital markets, IFRS were designed specifically for listed companies.
Adopting IFRS would provide European corporations a set of standards
that would facilitate cross-listings and allow them to raise capital beyond a
country’s borders in a cost-effective way. Companies with a desire to go
global pushed for this change, and governments were inclined to meet the
desires of such “giants.” Consequently, in 2000 the European Commission
mandated the use of IFRS starting from 2005 for consolidated accounts of all
publicly traded companies. 99
However, the EU decision was made without considering whether it was

States cannot use special laws to protect their own corporate law policies from circumvention by foreign
incorporation. Founders of companies can in principle “pick and choose” the best legal form from all
Member States.”).
96
Id. at 5–6.
97
See, e.g., John Flower, The Future Shape of Harmonization: The EU Versus the IASC Versus the
SEC, 6 EUR. ACCT. REV. 288 (1997) (telling how the draft accounting directive resembled German law
and practice and how the UK was not willing to accept such a directive. “The British accountancy
profession was horrified at the thoughts of being obliged to accept alien accounting principles consequent
on Britain’s entry into the European Union.”).
98
See infra Part III.C.1.
99
See IAS Regulation, supra note 10.
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right for all Member States. 100 IFRS originate from an Anglo-American
accounting culture where the purpose is to provide timely, useful, and
material information for decision-making by participants of the capital
markets (namely, investors). 101 This goal perfectly overlaps with the aims of
U.S. GAAP, but it does not necessarily meet the goals of financial reporting
within the EU countries where protecting the rights of creditors and
employees had historically been equally important—if not more.
For an Italian public firm, for example, it would not be surprising to be
controlled by a shareholder or a family, or a group of shareholders. Whereas
the proportion of such public firms controlled by a shareholder or a group of
shareholders would be much smaller in the United States in spite of the trend
to create super-voting shares 102 in companies such as Facebook and Google,
and the rise of institutional investors.103 In the case of a U.S. public firms,
financial reports are among the main documents that shareholders want
whereas for the Italian company the blockholder would not necessarily rely
on the financial reports as the controlling shareholder can access the
information independently. There are also creditors, the banks, who have an
interest. Indeed, not all public firms produce financial reports to the same
audience and for the same goal. Tax accounting, creditors, employee
benefits, long term investments, and short term profitability: all will play a

100
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 6, at 27 (“[C]urrent demand for global standards rejects historical
national standards competition. This rejection is epitomized by the European Union's mandate to replace
dozens of competing national standards with the single set of IFRS for all members. Specifically, the
European Union favors a single set to promote comparability for the sake of global capital flows and to
expand capitalism into places as unlikely as China and Russia.”).
101
Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 106, 148.
102
See, e.g., Tian Wen, You Can't Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock
Companies from Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2014); Miriam Gottfried,
Investors Beware the Super Powers of Supervoting Shares, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324296604578179861900450542; Steven Davidoff
Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 13,
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/?
_r=0. Arguably Google and Facebook shares with special rights are circumstantial and they exist due to
certain individuals who are very powerful but will disappear over time, i.e., after their lifetime. LYNN
STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 114 (2012); see generally Randall Smith, Global Finance: One Share,
One Vote? Groupon and Zynga Founders Get Extra Clout Before IPOs, WALL ST. J., Oct 28, 2011, at
C.3.
103
See, e.g.¸ Gilson & Gordon, supra note 91, at 865. (“In 2011, for example, institutional investors
owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.”). It should be
noted that institutional investors as a group do own the majority of the outstanding shares yet they do tend
to diversify among public corporations rather than acquiring the majority in one corporation. So, each
institutional investor owns a minority of the shares and when the institutional investors are combined,
they are the majority of the investors.
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role in financial reports.
For EU countries, financial reports are used for more than informing the
investors in a capital market; information gathered from financial reports are
used as the basis for computing corporate tax and calculating the distributable
profits. 104 A close look at IFRS would however reveal that it is not the right
fit when it comes to tax accounting. Tax accounting and financial accounting
are largely separate in Anglo-American accounting systems. Similarly,
distributable profits and legal capital have never been an issue in AngloAmerican systems akin to Continental Europe and this is among the reasons
why the EU Member States continue to use their traditional accounting
standards for entity-level accounts of listed and nonlisted firms. 105 Meeting
country level requirements demands something that is not specified in the
international level. 106
Considering that the majority of companies in the world, including the
subsidiaries of the listed companies, are not listed, most accounting is done
without the use of IFRS. 107 So long as these companies are not using IFRS,
IFRS are not truly global for accounting purposes and they are not actually
harmonizing accounting standards across nations. 108 On the contrary, the use
of IFRS creates a disparity at the national level between listed and nonlisted
companies for the sake of having international uniformity among financial
reports of all listed companies.
From an Anglo-American perspective, such a disparity between listed
and non-listed firms is not a problem. In the United States, U.S. GAAP is
mandatory for listed companies and there is no such requirement for
nonlisted U.S. companies, including nonlisted subsidiaries of listed
companies. 109 In other words, U.S. GAAP is not binding for the majority of
companies in the United States, and there are no publication or audit
requirements beyond the consolidated financial statements of companies

104
Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 166.; see also Bratton (2010), supra note 11, at 483–84
(“[B]lockholder governance systems . . . having control or influence over internal decision-making, suffer
diminished problems of agency and information asymmetry. . . . Accounting principles accordingly matter
less than they do, given the separation of ownership and control that prevails in the U.S.”); Stefano
Cascino, Mark Clatworthy, Beatriz Garcia Osma, Joachim Gassen, Shahed Imam & Thomas Jeanjean,
Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers, 11 ACCT. EUR.
185 (2014) (arguing different interest groups use financial reports for different purposes.).
105
Id. at 166.
106
Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 151–52, 166.
107
CHRISTOPHER NOBES & ROBERT PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 297–98
(12th ed., 2008); see also Christopher Nobes, On Researching into the Use of IFRS by Private Companies,
7 ACCT. EUR. 213 (2010).
108
That’s why the IFRS Foundation is relentlessly working on IFRS for SMEs and trying to convince
the nations to use it.
109
See NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 297–300.
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listed in a U.S. stock exchange. That IFRS are not binding for the majority
of the firms in the EU is not an issue from a capital market-oriented view, as
long as the listed companies are using IFRS.
This example of treatment disparity towards listed and nonlisted
companies is among many instances that show how IFRS are designed
similar, or even identical, to U.S. GAAP. The similarity of IFRS and U.S.
GAAP goes beyond a mere resemblance of some or most standards; it is
rooted in the Anglo-American culture of doing business—call it common law
origin, liberal market economies, shareholder primacy model, capital marketoriented model, or something else, but the focus is solely on listed companies
with diffused shareholders.
The similarity of IFRS and U.S. GAAP has been the main reason for
criticism and resistance in the EU and it is long argued that adoption of IFRS
disregards varieties of capitalism and pushes a capital market-oriented model
of “small, short-term investors with little to no long-term interaction with the
firm.” 110 Moreover, under the traditional Continental European approach,
employees, banks, and even governments are considered along with
shareholders. 111
As Walker warns, “[m]andating a single set of accounting standards
designed to accommodate the needs of liberal stock market economies, risks
doing harm to the alternative forms of capitalism that may be necessary for
the long-term development of the world.” 112 The possibility that a capital
market-oriented setting (such as IFRS in this case) may harm alternative
forms of capitalism was also raised in law and finance literature, and was
among the strongest criticisms of LLS et al., as it could be devastating for
developing countries whose economies are fragile. 113 A better word for the

110

See, e.g., Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 161 & n.284.
See, e.g., NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 42–43 (“For example, the importance of banks in
Germany may be a reason for greater conservatism in reporting. It is widely held that bankers are more
interested in ‘rock-bottom’ figures in order to satisfy themselves that long-term loans are safe”); see also,
Flower, supra note 97, at 288–89 (“the IASC's standards have reflected the Anglo-American approach
to financial reporting and have completely ignored the traditional approach of Continental Europe.”).
112
Martin Walker, Accounting for Varieties of Capitalism: The Case Against a Single Set of Global
Accounting Standards, 42 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 137, 150 (2010) (“Imposing a single form of accounting,
designed for a particular form of capitalism, runs the risk of preventing alternative forms of financial,
economic, and legal governance from evolving.”).
113
See, e.g., Pistor, supra note 58, at 1660–61 (“[T]he relentless pursuit of pro market reforms in
fragile countries may have exacerbated latent political and ethnic conflicts and further destabilize them.”)
(citing Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and
Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998)); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); ROBERT
H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (2001). Beyond law
and finance literature many scholars criticized this. See, e.g., Andreas Nölke & James Perry, The Power
of Transnational Private Governance: Financialization and the IASB, 9 BUS. & POL. 1 (2007) (having an
111
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world’s adopting of IFRS instead of “harmonization” of accounting
standards would be “transplantation” of these standards in different
economies. Indeed, the literature on the transplantation of laws may better
explain the hurdles of IFRS adoption. 114
Arguably, the Continental European method of accounting, combined
with the governance and financing structure of coordinated market
economies, granted companies in Continental Europe a competitive
advantage by allowing them to “follow long-term strategies such as investing
heavily in production and human resource development.” 115 Similarly,
Grossfeld argues that different corporate governance structures may need
different accounting standards. 116
If indeed “there is a real possibility that international movements of
capital will even out national factor endowments,” then harmonization of
accounting standards towards a capital market-oriented system may signal
that nations are already going in that direction. 117 However, a better approach
could be to realize that “there is more than one way of doing business” and
“in order to accommodate different varieties of capitalism, we may need to
allow accounting standards to reflect the type of economic system.” 118 As
Mattli & Büthe put it, accounting traditions depend on the business and legal
cultures of a given country and, when it comes to finding the “best” approach,
“[t]here is no right or wrong answer. . . . It’s like religion – Christianity or
Buddhism.” 119
For that reason, the EU has not mandated IFRS for nonlisted companies
and entity-level accounts of listed companies. By leaving the decision to
Member States on whether to adopt IFRS beyond the consolidated accounts
of listed companies, the EU allows different economies to decide on the
extent they want to keep their traditional accounting system, and the extent

LMEs versus CMEs discussion especially at 10–11); see also Perry & Nölke, supra note 53.
114
See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 101 (2002); Dan Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003); see also Amir N.
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance
Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 205 (2001).
115
Andreas Nölke, A Political Economy Explanation for Country Variation in IFRS Adoption, 3 ACCT.
ECON. & L. 69, 72 (2013).
116
Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles v. International Accounting Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 847, 858 (2003) (“We
find similar origins but different locations. However, when ‘location, location, location’ is the core of
business, the same might be true for accounting.”).
117
VARITIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 75, at 36.
118
Walker, supra note 112, at 149–50.
119
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULES: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 11 (2011).
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to which these economies want to align with liberal market economies.120
IFRS for SMEs, however, could be the next step towards eliminating
the varieties of capitalism. While eliminating the disparity between listed and
unlisted firms, IFRS for SMEs could spell the end of varieties of capitalism
and setting the shareholder primacy model as the ideal one. 121 Interestingly,
right at the same time with the IASB, the United States, after decades of
apathy, is now, interested in developing a simplified version of US GAAP
for nonlisted firms. 122
3. The Myth of Harmonization
Expecting harmonization simply by switching to the same accounting
standard is misplaced. Harmonizing standards does not necessarily mean that
implementation disparities will erode over time. 123 When it comes to
implementation of IFRS, it is not common law or civil law that makes the
difference, but how these standards are interrelated with other local
circumstances including social norms, national laws and regulations.
Accounting quality is a function of a firm’s overall institutional setting,
including the legal and political system of the country in which the firm
resides. Different implementation of the same accounting standards across
countries contributes to this. 124 Implementing and enforcing consistency of

120
To see what each Member State chose to do, see the table and accompanying text in our earlier
paper; Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 163–67.
121
Among others, Nölke & Perry are also cautious about IFRS for SMEs. They explain of how
devastating it could be for German SMEs. See Nölke & Perry, supra note 113, at 12–13 (“these standards
. . . threaten the key competitive advantages of the Rhenish model of capitalism”); see generally, Perry &
Nölke, supra note 53.
122
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PRIVATE COMPANY DECISION-MAKING
FRAMEWORK: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING GUIDANCE
FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES (2012), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=
1176160210366&acceptedDisclaimer=true ; see also THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CPAS, FINANCIAL
REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR SMES, http://www.aicpa.org/INTERESTAREAS/FRC/ACCOUNTING
FINANCIALREPORTING/PCFR/Pages/Financial-Reporting-Framework.aspx (“The AICPA has issued
its Financial Reporting Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Entities. The FRF for SMEs accounting
framework is designed for America's small business community.”); see also THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CPAS, COMPARISONS OF THE FRF FOR SMES REPORTING FRAMEWORK TO OTHER BASES OF
ACCOUNTING (2014), http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/FRC/AccountingFinancialReporting/PCFR/
DownloadableDocuments/FRF-SME/FRFforSMEs_Comparison_OCBOAs.pdf.
123
See supra note 87.
124
See generally, Naomi S. Soderstrom & Kevin Jialin Sun, IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality:
A Review, 16 EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING REV. 675 (2007); see also Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki,
Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions
for Future Research 6 (Univ. of Chi. & MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 1, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105398 (“[W]e highlight the importance of market
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international standards is encumbered when national institutions have
varying capability levels (strong or weak, experienced or not, etc.) and
varying priorities. Thus, path dependency plays an important role;
accountants make decisions in light of their preconceptions and the
institutional settings in which they operate. Harmonization requires more
than just adopting the same standards.
Different priorities among economies combine with “discretion” or
“professional judgment” when preparing and approving financial statements.
Thus, even when the standards are the same, the results can be different. As
Nobes and Parker says, “although, there is always a set of rules that
accountants follow, no set can possibly cover every detail.” 125 Accountants
use professional judgment which inevitably depends on circumstances, and
circumstances often differ across economies. 126
It is a long believed phenomenon that profits would be consistently
lower in Continental European countries than in the United States or the UK
due to conservatism in Continental European accounting. 127 So long as entity
level accounts are prepared under the principle of conservatism and aligned
with tax accounting, while consolidated accounts instead use principles such
as fair value and report to the capital markets, 128 there exists a problematic
duality in financial reporting. 129 Flower commented on this suboptimal
solution in the late 1990s, even before the mandatory adoption of IFRS
(which was then the IAS) in the EU, and when negotiations were still going
on. 130 He believed that separate standards for consolidated and individual
accounts would damage the credibility of accounts and confuse the general

forces in influencing firms’ disclosure and reporting choices, both in isolation as well as the interactions
with regulatory acts. . . . We also point to significant complementarities between the elements of a
country’s institutional infrastructure. Given these complementarities, we highlight that unilateral changes
in disclosure and accounting rules are unlikely to yield the desired outcomes.”).
125
NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 4.
126
Id. at 4, 161.
127
Id. at 43. But as the Daimler-Benz example shows, there could be incidents where a Europe-based
cross-listed company could end up showing less profits when switched to U.S. GAAP (more specifically,
from German GAAP to U.S. GAAP in the case of Daimler-Benz). For a brief explanation of how and why
Daimler-Benz showed less profits when switched to U.S. GAAP, see Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of
the IASC into the IASB, and the Challenges It Faces, 87 ACCT. REV. 807, 817–18 (2012). See also Axel
Berger, The Development and Status of Enforcement in the European Union, 7 ACCT. IN EUR. 15, 16
(2010).
128
See generally Nölke & Perry, supra note 113; see also Perry & Nölke, supra note 53.
129
See, e.g., Flower, supra note 97, at 297 (“The general public would expect the consolidated
accounts to be the sum of the accounts of the individual companies that make up the group; it would surely
harm the credibility of the accounts if a group were to report profits of, say, $100 million when according
to the accounts of the individual companies in the group, profits totalled only $50 million.”).
130
Id.
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public, including shareholders. 131 Nobes and Parker give examples from the
UK and Germany on how national laws and regulations (on taxable income,
distributable profits, asset impairments, and recognition and measurement of
intangible assets) find their way into financial reports under IFRS. 132
When criticizing the use of fair value accounting (FVA), Nölke and
Perry argue that FVA is more appropriate when measuring financial assets
rather than manufacturing activity, and that the value of capital assets will
always be ambiguous if they are calculated with a “subjective vision of the
future” where the “future is inherently unknowable” 133 “Accounting is thus
an inherently political act.” 134 With so much criticism and so many issues to
overcome, why and how did the IFRS Foundation become the sole
international standard setter?
III. FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS FOR THE WORLD
A. A Framework for Viewing the Process of Global Standard Setting
Law-making at the international level historically meant state
involvement from the beginning to the end. Thus, international law often
looks at bilateral or multilateral agreements among states in which signatory
states often need additional approval from their parliament, senate, etc. One
step further, an international organization can be created in a way such that
sovereign states give their consent for it to coordinate initiatives on their
behalf. Multilateral investment treaties or bilateral tax agreements are
examples of the first type; the United Nations (UN), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the World Bank are examples of international
organizations created by way of states’ ex ante consent. These two classical
ways of making law in the international arena are deemed legitimate so long
as either (1) the states approve the international agreement as being the law,
or (2) they give away their law-making power by creating these international

131

See, e.g., Flower, supra note 97, at 297.
NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 162. National choices find its way either because there is
room for judgment in IFRS or often, consolidated accounts (under IFRS) use the same accounting policies
as group statements; see also Maria Gee, Axel Heller & Christopher Nobes, The Influence of Tax on IFRS
Consolidated Statements: the Convergence of Germany and the UK, 7 ACCT. EUR. 97, 97 (2010) (“The
literature on the links between tax and financial reporting suggests that the strength of those links varies
over time and from one jurisdiction to another.”).
133
Nölke & Perry, supra note 113, at 3, 6, 8 (“Assets are always a compression of future social
relations into the present”); Perry & Nölke, supra note 53, at 562 (“[F]uture is inherently unknowable,
any precise value placed on an asset is ultimately an estimation of the future rather than a simple fact.”).
134
Nölke & Perry, supra note 113, at 3 (“[A]ccounting numbers are both an ex-post validation of prior
economic resource allocation, and at the same time central to the construction of the economic reality
upon which future resource allocation decisions will be based. Accounting is thus an inherently political
act.”).
132
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organizations upfront.
However, a relatively new approach to making international law has
emerged and the adoption of IFRS is the most significant example of this
model. IASB, a private international organization initially created by (mostly
Anglo-American) accounting bodies, is now setting international accounting
standards. States that have adopted these standards, and made them binding
for corporations (mostly for listed corporations), have done so only after the
standard setting process is nearly finalized. Some states knew they would
adopt these standards eventually. However, many states do not have
influence on the content of these standards. It is deemed more appropriate to
let “the experts” be in charge of setting standards on such a “technical”
matter.
The first impression is that states are mere adopters, not standardsetters. However, a close look at the IASB and the standards per se reveal an
undeniable fact: some states get to say a lot, if not everything. As a result,
there is a startling resemblance between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 135 The single
most influential economy on this standard setting body has been the United
States, despite that it has not yet adopted IFRS.
Looking at how IFRS have spread around the world indicates that the
EU decision mandating that all listed companies use IFRS (starting from
2005) triggered widespread adoption. Yet, even the EU has not been
successful enough to influence the International Accounting Standard Board
(IASB) as much as it desired. 136 The United States’s hegemony in
international lawmaking was identified over a decade ago by many who
observed that U.S. agencies such as the SEC had turned into “international
lawmakers.” 137 Thinking about the smaller economies, it is noteworthy that
they remain convinced that this adoption process will benefit them despite
their inability to influence the standard-setting board.

135
Stuart H. Deming, International Financial Reporting Standards: Their Importance to U.S. Business
and Legal Practice, 84 MICH. BAR J., Dec. 2005, at 14, 17; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-final-report.pdf.
136
See, e.g., BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 119, at 99–101 (“A telling example is IFRS 8, adopted by
the IASB on 30 November 2006 . . . against vehement opposition from European interests, including
investors and civil society groups”); see also PHILIPPE MAYSTADT, SHOULD IFRS STANDARDS BE MORE
"EUROPEAN”? 5 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/docs/governance/reform/131112_report_
en.pdf (pointing to the fact that North America is most influential and the EU influence is reduced because
it is diffuse).
137
See, e.g., David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 547, 549 (2005); see also Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1 (showing U.S. hegemony on accounting
standard setting).
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B. Formation and Evolution of the Private International Standard
Setter
The 1970s mark the start of the new era of accounting standard-setting.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the standard setter of
the United States, was created in 1973. 138 The Accounting Standards Steering
Committee, the first national standard setter of the UK, was created in
1970. 139 The EU’s accounting harmonization plan came out by 1978 as the
Fourth Directive. 140 The UN created a Group of Experts on International
Standards of Accounting and Reporting (GEISAR) in 1976. 141 The OECD,
becoming aware of attempts to set accounting standards under the aegis of
the UN, quickly formed an Ad Hoc Accounting Committee and showed
interest in setting standards for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in 1978. 142
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) was formed in 1977. 143
This era also marks the beginning of the global financial regulation with the
establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1974. 144
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the
predecessor of the IASB, was also created in the 1970s. It was launched after
an informal meeting between the representatives of the British and American
profession during the 1972 World Accounting Congress. 145 During this
meeting, the formation of a new international body was “discreetly
discussed” though the IASC initiative was not made public until the
committee was formally founded. 146 By 1973, with the invitation of the

138

Facts about FASB, FASB.ORG, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
Knowledge Guide to U.K. Accounting Standards, ICAEW.COM, http://www.icaew.com/en/library/
subject-gateways/accounting-standards/knowledge-guide-to-uk-accounting-standards (last visited Sept.
2, 2016).
140
1978 O.J. (L 222).
141
Sheikh F. Rahman, International Accounting Regulation by the United Nations: A Power
Perspective, 11 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 593, 599–601 (1998). After GEISAR an Ad
Hoc Group was created in 1979 by the resolution 1979/44. ISAR as today was formed in 1982 with the
ECOSOC Resolution 1982/62 dated Oct. 27, 1982. In that Resolution, ECOSOC refers to the resolution
1979/44 setting out the terms of reference for the former Ad Hoc ISAR. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan,
From an Idea to a Standard: The UN and the Global Governance of Accountants’ Competence,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228541804_From_an_Idea_to_a_
RESEARCHGATE.NET,
Standard_The_UN_and_the_Global_Governance_of_Accountants%27_Competence; see also NOBES &
PARKER, supra note 107, at 98.
142
WOLK ET AL., supra note 20, at 320; NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 97.
143
History, IFAC.ORG, http://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/organization-overview/history.
144
Bank for International Settlements, History of the Basel Committee, BIS.ORG, http://www.bis.org/
bcbs/history.htm.
145
See PETER WALTON, AN EXECUTIVE GUIDE TO IFRS: CONTENT, COSTS AND BENEFITS TO
BUSINESS (2011) (“the creation of the IASC . . . came about almost as an accident.”).
146
KEES CAMFFERMAN & STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FINANCIAL REPORTING AND GLOBAL CAPITAL
139
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accounting bodies of the UK and the United States, nine national accounting
bodies together created the IASC. 147 Starting from the formation of IASC,
U.S. dominance was evident and U.S. GAAP users were assured that the new
standards would be similar to theirs. A Wall Street Journal article published
in 1973, for instance, stated that the IASC standards to be produced would
not be inconsistent with U.S. GAAP. 148
In addition to (and because of) the enormous size of the U.S. securities
markets, the United States enjoys the benefits of being the first mover as a
co-creator of the IASC. 149 Applying game theory, Mattli and Büthe, for
instance, argue that the first mover acquires great benefits and sets the
international standard agenda while the switching cost would be absorbed by
the followers. 150 When looking at the determinants of the first mover, they
find certain institutions play a critical role. Calling it “institutional
complementarities,” they show how a strong national standard setting body
made the United States a first mover. 151 It is not just the expert-driven
standard setter at the national level that made the United States a first mover.
The United States also had the largest and most sophisticated capital market
in the world. 152 As Simmons and later Martinez-Diaz explain in their
respective papers, “global power [was] unusually concentrated in the sphere
of international finance” providing the United States a hegemonic position in
international standard setting and later on the endorsement of the standards
set. 153 Simmons defines the United States as a hegemonic power that will
always be the first mover as “it is costlier to alter its preferred regulatory
innovation than try to change the policies of the rest of the world.” 154
Martinez-Diaz points out that “those who diverge from the hegemonic

MARKETS: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1973 – 2000 43,
54 (2006).
147
The nine founding national accounting bodies of IASC are United Kingdom (with Ireland), United
States, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Japan, France, Germany, Netherlands. See, e.g., BRUCE MACKENZIE
ET AL., WILEY IFRS 2014: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS 4 (2014); NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 85; see also Martinez-Diaz, supra
note 1, at 7.
148
Richard F. Janssen, Panel Aims to Unify Accounting Methods Across Globe, Sees Strong Effect by
1983, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1973, at 14; see also CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 54.
149
See, e.g., Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 5; Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of
Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT'L ORGANIZATION 589, 595 (2001).
150
Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy
of Power? 56 WORLD POL. 1, 4, 10–11 (2003). This game-theoretic approach is often described by the
“battle of sexes.” See Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 5.
151
Mattli & Büthe, supra note 150, at 10.
152
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 4–5.
153
Id. at 2, 5; see also Simmons, supra note 149, at 595.
154
Simmons, supra note 149, at 595.
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standard will be excluded from the world’s largest and richest financial
markets, at great cost to themselves.” 155 These studies explain why and how
the United States, together with the UK, initiated and supported IASC/B and
show why the rest of the world followed this initiation despite many hurdles
they faced at the national level.
Having the support of a major economy such as the United States did
not immediately turn the IASC into an influential body. As a Wall Street
Journal article noted at the initiation of the standard-setting board, the effects
of IASC were anticipated by 1983. 156 For over a decade the IASC was not
dominant in setting accounting standards, let alone the sole international
body for accounting standards. For instance, surveys on European and
American firms conducted in 1979 and 1981 respectively revealed that
references to IAS were rare. 157 Even among U.K.-based multinationals, IAS
had little influence according to surveys conducted in 1984. 158
The first step in the rise of the IASC came with the start of negotiations
with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in
1987. 159 During these negotiations, IOSCO and IASC agreed to work
together to facilitate cross-listing of companies in the jurisdiction of IOSCO
members. 160 This collaboration was commonly called the creation of an
international “passport” as it would allow a company listed in one stock
exchange to be listed in another simply by presenting the same financial
reports, rather than using the accounting rules of the cross-listed
jurisdiction.161
1. IOSCO Endorsement
Before moving into further evidence showing the role of the U.S. in
getting IOSCO endorsement, it is important to understand the purpose of
IOSCO and of an IOSCO endorsement. That IOSCO was created in 1983, a
decade after IASC, yet has authority to approve what IASC produces, is
indicative of the powerful role of IOSCO. According to their website,
“IOSCO develops, implements and promotes adherence to internationally
recognized standards for securities regulation. . . . Its membership regulates
more than 95% of the world's securities markets in more than 115

155

Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 5.
Janssen, supra note 148, at 14.
157
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 10.
158
Id.
159
MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 147, at 4.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 4–5; see generally Douglas W. Arner, Globalisation of Financial Markets: An International
Passport For Securities Offerings? 35 INT'L LAWYER 1543 (2001).
156
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jurisdictions . . . .” 162 Among the members of IOSCO are national stock
exchange regulators such as the U.S. SEC, and non-governmental
organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
the largest non-governmental regulator of securities firms doing business in
the United States.163
In the beginning of negotiations to create the passport, IOSCO became
a member of the IASC’s Consultative Group, and representatives from
IOSCO were “invited to comment on all of the IASC exposure drafts and
draft statements of principles.” 164 When created in 1983, IOSCO had
members only from North and South America. 165 Other national securities
regulators joined only after the initiation of this international body. 166
With the establishment of IOSCO, the highly influential role of the U.S.,
and more precisely the SEC, became evident. For instance, when Richard
Breeden became the Chair of the SEC, he attended IOSCO meetings himself
rather than sending his staff; when he was not satisfied with the work of their
Technical Committee, the SEC wrote a Strategic Assessment recommending
(successfully) that it be reorganized. 167 With the reorganization, Breeden
became the Chair, while the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation
Finance became the Chair of the working party on “Multinational
Disclosures and Accounting.” 168
For IASC to boost the adoption (among national regulators) of the then
International Accounting Standards (IAS) (currently IFRS), it seemed logical
to convince IOSCO. But convincing IOSCO meant getting approval from the
U.S. SEC. As Simmons notes, IASC knew that its standards would not have
credibility without IOSCO and SEC support. 169 Further, the SEC would not
accept standards that do not resemble U.S. GAAP. 170 However, gaining
approval from the SEC was not easy; with its size and the capacity of its
technical staff, the SEC was known to be “undeviatingly attentive [to] the
setting of, and compliance with, accounting standards.” 171 Rejection from the
SEC would end the adoption of these standards by other national

162
About IOSCO, IOSCO.ORG, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco (last visited
Dec. 19, 2016).
163
Id. For a detailed list of IOSCO members, see IOSCO Membership, IOSCO.ORG,
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=membership&memid=1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
164
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 324.
165
About IOSCO, supra note 162.
166
Id.
167
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 306.
168
Id.
169
Simmons, supra note 149, at 611.
170
Id.
171
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 295.
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regulators. 172
Starting in 1987, this produced a core standards work plan (in 1995)
where IOSCO was allowed to monitor the IASC’s standard setting process.
In return, IOSCO would “consider” endorsing IAS. 173 The SEC supported
the process, and in 1996 announced that, “if the IASC successfully completes
the agreed-upon work plan, and if those standards satisfy the conditions for
acceptance described by the Commission in its April statement, the
Commission would consider accepting the core standards in securities
offerings by foreign registrants.” 174
In the early 1990s, standard setting bodies from the United States, UK,
Canada, and Australia, created a think-tank whose meetings IASC attended
as an observer (this group was later referred to as G4+1). 175 During these
meetings, FASB and IASC discussed controversial accounting issues and
future steps which could impact the IASC and the IASB. 176 G4 style AngloAmerican study groups on international accounting matters were not
uncommon. Even before the creation of IASC, in 1966 the professional
bodies of Canada, the UK, and the United States formed the Accountants’
International Study Group (AISG) to examine their differences (it issued
twenty studies). 177 When AISG disbanded in 1976, the IASC “had
effectively taken over the study group’s mantle.” 178
Anglo-American study groups such as AISG and the G4 were believed
to produce results more effectively. It was also easier to convince other
countries once the common-law countries expressed a mutual position.
Moreover, having such a group readily available proved an effective means
of leverage with other nations and international organizations who might be
inclined to move in a different direction. With such study groups, the United
States had the option to proceed with alternative organizations over the
IASB. In one instance, this dynamic helped the United States convince the

172
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 11 (“[R]ejection of the package of standards by the IOSCO—and
by its most powerful member, the U.S. SEC—would severely limit the future of IASC standards.”).
173
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 295.
174
Michael H. Sutton, Chief Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
International
Accounting
Standards:
Progress
and
Challenges
(Nov.
10,
1997),
https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1997/spch196.txt.
175
Later New Zealand joined as well. MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 147, at 9; NOBES & PARKER,
supra note 107, at 95.
176
See, e.g., Donna L. Street, The G4’s Role in the Evolution of the International Accounting Standard
Setting Process and Partnership with the IASB, 15 J. INT’L ACCT., AUDITING & TAXATION 109, 125
(2006).
177
NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 95; CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 57–58.
178
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 58.
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IASC to follow an SEC proposal over a European one. 179 The SEC had
proposed a structure with an expert-based board similar to that of the FASB
(in the United States), whereas the European Commission proposed a
representative model that would be “independent of any national standard
setter or any group of national standard setters.” 180 The United States
threatened to empower the G4 and move forward without European input, if
this was to happen.
In May of 2000, IOSCO provided its endorsement, and approved thirty
standards set by the IASC and recommended its member jurisdictions to
allow multinational issuers use these standards. 181 The SEC was among the
IOSCO members that approved and recommended the standards, though
their consent was based upon the condition that IASC would restructure
according to the SEC’s preferences. After receiving conditional IOSCO
approval and continued SEC pressure, IASC restructured in 2001 with a fulltime standard-setting body, the IASB. 182 Soon after the formation of the
IASB, the G4 announced that they would no longer meet; most of the AngloAmerican standard setters became IASB members. 183
In June 2000, shortly after the IOSCO’s endorsement in May of that
year, the European Commission published an outline strategy on financial
reporting. With it, the European Commission proposed to mandate the use of
IFRS by all listed companies by 2005. 184 To implement this strategy, in 2002

179
SEBASTIAN BOTZEM, THE POLITICS OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION: ORGANIZING TRANSNATIONAL
STANDARD SETTING IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 97–98 (2012) (citing CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note
146).
For Strategy Working Party (SWP)’s 1998 and 1999 Reports, see STRATEGY WORKING PARTY, INT’L
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM., SHAPING IASC FOR THE FUTURE (1998), http://www.iasplus.com/
en/binary/restruct/1998swp_1.pdf; STRATEGY WORKING PARTY, INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS ON SHAPING IASC FOR THE FUTURE (1999), http://www.iasplus.com/en/
binary/restruct/1999swpfinal.pdf. Right after the publication of the final SWP report, the SEC showed its
support. Press Release, Lynn E. Turner, Statement of SEC Chief Accountant Lynn E. Turner on IASC
Board Decision to Support Restructuring Plan (Nov. 17, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press/pressarchive/1999/99-152.txt (“This proposal balances calls for a structure based upon geographic
representativeness and those based on technical competence and independence.”).
180
STRATEGY WORKING PARTY, INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS ON
SHAPING IASC FOR THE FUTURE 96–97 (1999), http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/restruct/
1999swpfinal.pdf.
181
Press Release, IOSCO, IASC Standards (May 17, 2000), http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/
IOSCONEWS26.pdf; IOSCO Resolutions, IOSCO.ORG, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=
resolutions (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); see also Arner, supra note 161, at 1575; CLARE ROBERTS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE REPORTING: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 340–41 (4th ed. 2008).
182
See, e.g., NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 96, 103 (“IOSCO and the SEC were important
contributors to the discussions that led to the creation of the IASB in 2001.”).
183
Street, supra note 176, at 109; NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 95.
184
COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EU FINANCIAL REPORTING STRATEGY: THE WAY
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the European Commission passed a regulation mandating IAS/IFRS by 2005
for consolidated reports of all listed companies in the Member States of the
European Economic Area. 185 At the time, Europe faced internal pressure to
adopt international standards to facilitate multinationals’ cross-listings,
especially in the United States.
In 2001, International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation
(IFRSF or IFRS Foundation) replaced IASC. Since then, IFRSF operates as
a not-for-profit corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware and the
board sits in London where the Foundation is registered as a foreign
company, an American one.
2. IASB Cooperates with FASB
Even after the IASC restructured and the EU mandated the use of
IAS/IFRS, seven years passed (until 2007) before the SEC allowed foreign
companies to cross-list in the U.S. using IFRS. U.S. regulators did not let
foreign issuers convert to those standards without a “heavy guiding hand.” 186
However, even with the heavy resemblance and strong SEC guidance, U.S.
multinationals still do not have the option to use IFRS. U.S. listed firms must
use U.S. GAAP. 187
The IASB restructuring in 2001 strengthened relations between FASB
and IASB; further, the two boards signed the Norwalk Agreement in 2002
that led to regular meetings and ongoing work on the convergence of their
standards. 188 For many, the structural similarities, the convergence project,
and strong SEC monitoring turned the IASB into a “carbon copy” of FASB–
only with global power. 189 IASC had already approved the “Framework for

FORWARD (2000), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0359:FIN:EN:
PDF.
This publication is mentioned even in IAS Regulation that later mandated the use of IAS/IFRS. IAS
Regulation, supra note 10 (“On 13 June 2000, the Commission published its Communication on ‘EU
Financial Reporting Strategy: the way forward’ in which it was proposed that all publicly traded
Community companies prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with one single set
of accounting standards, namely International Accounting Standards (IAS), at the latest by 2005.”); see
also ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 181, at 438.
185
IAS Regulation, supra note 10; see also ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 181, at 439.
186
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 6.
187
For further comments on U.S. listed firms using GAAP but not allowed to use IFRS a discussion
on whether there should be an option, see Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 166–89.
188
MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 147, at 9.
189
Bratton, supra note 11, at 476 (“IASB is a carbon copy of the FASB except with a larger cast of
characters and geographic distribution requirements.”); see also Leuz, supra note 87, at 250 (“[E]ven if
U.S. decides not to adopt IFRS or not to permit U.S. firms to use IFRS, one can argue that IFRS and U.S.
GAAP are close enough so that standards are not the issue.”).
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the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements” in April 1989
which heavily relies on the Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts
(SFACs), a series published in 1980s by FASB. 190 This framework was
formally re-adopted by the new board, the IASB, in April 2001 and has been
revised several times since then. In spite of revisions the 1989 framework is
still in effect.191 The revisions on the Conceptual Framework of the IFRS
over time brought it even closer to that of the FASB.
The “three-tier governance structure” of IFRS is copied from the U.S.
model of FASB. Both FASB and IASB have trustees of their respective
foundations appointing the members of the standard setting boards and both
have an advisory council. 192 In addition to U.S. representation in each “tier,”
the U.S. SEC is among the members of the monitoring board (together with
the European Commission, IOSCO, as well as the securities regulators of
Japan, Brazil, Korea, and China). 193 Since the most powerful member of the
IOSCO is the SEC, arguably SEC dominance is even stronger at the
monitoring level. A good example for the dominance of the United States
and of a capital market-oriented regime is the IFRS Interpretations
Committee (former IFRIC) liaising with the U.S. Emerging Issues Task
Force. In addition to this liaison, it has fourteen representatives out of which
currently only two members are from all Continental European countries
combined while the United States and the UK have three members each. If
one member each from Canada, Australia, and South Africa added, there are
nine members from common law countries reviewing the implementation of
IFRS and providing authoritative guidance. 194 “[T]he FASB-IASB joint
project has resulted in changes both in U.S. GAAP and IFRS to the extent

190

ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 181, at 387.
The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, IFRS FOUNDATION (2012),
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/IFRS-technical-summaries/Documents/English%20Web%20Summaries%20
2013/Conceptual%20Framework.pdf (“The IASB Framework was approved by the IASC Board in April
1989 for publication in July 1989, and adopted by the IASB in April 2001. In September 2010, as part of
a bigger project to revise the Framework the IASB revised the objective of general purpose financial
reporting and the qualitative characteristics of useful information. The remaining of the document from
1989 remains effective.”).
192
Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 114 (“First, IASB consists of fifteen independent experts,
four of whom are American. Second, five out of the twenty-two Trustees of the IFRS Foundation are
from the United States. Third, the Monitoring Board is made up of five securities regulators including
the SEC. In other words, U.S. influence is perceptible at all levels of the institutional structure associated
with the IFRS.”).
193
Monitoring Board, IFRS FOUNDATION, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/MonitoringBoard.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
194
Members of the IFRS Interpretations Committee (formerly IFRIC), IFRS FOUNDATION,
http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Members-of-IFRS-IC/Pages/Members-of-the-IFRS-IC.aspx
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2016).
191
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that they are now far more similar than they are different. In fact, IFRS mirror
U.S. GAAP in many respects.” 195 Simmons argues that, IASC/IASB “has
provided the cover of multilateral legitimacy to mostly U.S. standards.” 196
The situation was best described in 2007 by the IASB Chair, Sir David
Tweedie. When asked about the convergence project, Sir Tweedie explained
the new program between the IASB and FASB as jointly writing new
standards replacing outdated ones. 197 When asked about the reaction of the
rest of the world, he replied: “They’re jealous, frankly, because, they see two
gorillas out there and they are in danger of getting squashed between them. .
. . Sorry. Not many people are following your standards. A lot of people are
following U.S. GAAP and a lot of people are following IFRS.” 198
3. Due Process and Accountability Becomes Critical
The Foundation tried to overcome its democratic legitimacy
deficiencies by reviewing its constitution periodically. Subsequently, it has
(1) required a geographic quota for the appointment of Trustees and board
members, (2) added a consultative mechanism called due process, and (3)
included a monitoring board. Yet the success of these additions is
questionable.
First, although geographic quotas for IFRS Foundation Trustees have
been used since 2001, it was only in 2010 when slots were given to Africa
and South America did those extend outside of North American and
European countries. 199 Also in 2010, the IFRS Foundation extended the
geographic quota to board members as well. 200 However, a closer look
reveals that a membership quota by geographical origin does not bring
“diversity” to the board as required by the IFRS Foundation Constitution. 201

195

Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 7, at 114.
Simmons, supra note 149, at 611.
197
Geoffrey Pickard, Simplifying Global Accounting, 204 J. ACCT. 36 (2007).
198
Id. at 38.
199
BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 168; see also IFRS Foundation, Trustees of the IFRS Foundation,
IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Foundation/Oversight/Trustees/Pages/Trustees.aspx (last
visited Dec. 19, 2016).
200
BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 168.
201
The Constitution itself states the “diversity” requirement. IFRS FOUNDATION, IFRS FOUNDATION
CONSTITUTION
(2013),
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/
Constitution/Documents/IFRS-Foundation-Constitution-January-2013.pdf (Section 6 for Trustees states
“[t]he mix of Trustees shall broadly reflect the world’s capital markets and diversity of geographical and
professional backgrounds.” Section 25 states “[t]he main qualifications for membership of the IASB shall
be professional competence and practical experience. […] it will comprise a group of people representing,
within that group, the best available combination of technical expertise and diversity of international
business and market experience in order to contribute to the development of high quality, global financial
196
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The expertise necessary to be appointed to the board includes an auditing
background or an Anglo-American accounting education. 202 The Big Four
global accounting firms benefit as a result, as they have extensive expertise
in these areas. Further, the technical expertise required for board membership
favors Anglo-Americans, who often have extensive capital market
expertise. 203 Botzem sees the addition of a geographic quota as an “attempt
at enhancing the IASB’s credibility in emerging markets while securing the
supremacy of Anglo-American actors.” 204
For many countries to build capacity to the proficiency level needed
would take years of intensive training, except for people with experience
working for the Big Four. The technical expertise needed for board
membership was also supplied substantially by these firms, creating a
powerful network within the IFRS Foundation. 205 Additionally, the Big Four
fund the IFRS Foundation generously–each contributes $2.5 million
annually. 206 The total contribution from the international accounting firms is
more than the annual contribution of the European Commission and the
United States combined. 207 With the widespread presence of the Big Four at
every level of the Foundation, their undeniable influence suggests that
“diversity” requires more than a geographic quota.
Second, due process is viewed as an essential part of standard setting.
Due process helps create accountability and is a valuable tool to create
legitimacy for accounting standard-setting at the international level. 208 IFRS

reporting standards.” Section 39 governing IFRIC membership and Section 45 regarding the Advisory
Council both requiring diversity.).
202
See, e.g., IFRS Foundation, Members of the IASB, IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/
Members/Pages/Members-of-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“The International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) is an independent group of 14 experts with an appropriate mix of recent practical
experience in setting accounting standards, in preparing, auditing, or using financial reports, and in
accounting education. Broad geographical diversity is also required.”); IFRS Foundation, supra note 199
(“Each Trustee is expected to have an understanding of, and be sensitive to, international issues relevant
to the success of an international organisation responsible for the development of high quality global
accounting standards for use in the world's capital markets and by other users.”).
203
BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 103.
204
Id. at 168.
205
See generally BOTZEM, supra note 179.
206
IFRS FOUNDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2014 44–48 (2015), http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRSFoundation/Oversight/Annual-reports/Documents/IFRS-Foundation-Annual-Report-2014UPDATED.pdf.
207
Id. If individual contributions from each of the European countries were added to the number (i.e.,
France £792,016, Germany £802,401), the EU would be by far the largest contributor yet this is another
striking point considering the U.S. dominance and EU’s’ constant complaints of this fact. Even the
funding through EU is multi-channeled which is a hurdle when there is a desire to dominate the institution
as the EU.
208
See Alan J. Richardson & Burckard Eiberlin, Legitimating Transnational Standard Setting: The
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rely extensively on this process for that reason. In 2006, the Foundation
Trustees approved publication of the first Due Process Handbook for the
IASB, which has been revised several times since. 209 Like many other
components of the IFRS Foundation, the use of due process was adopted
from FASB of the United States. 210 The Handbook establishes mandatory
and voluntary steps for the IASB, and the Interpretations Committee, to
comply with principles of due process (which is mainly a consultation
process). 211 Three principles included are (a) transparency, (b) full and fair
consultation, and (c) accountability. Accountability is defined as “analys[ing]
the potential effects of its proposals on affected parties and explains the
rationale for why it made the decisions it reached in developing or changing
a Standard”. 212
However, the meaning of due process and accountability in this context
are puzzling. For instance, accountability includes analyzing and explaining
the rationale for board decisions. But, this alone would not normally meet an
accountability requirement—especially if there are no further steps (unless it
is viewed solely as a transparency mechanism, which is distinct from
accountability under the three principles identified above). The idea of due
process is also problematic. Botzem finds that IASB’s due process is often
“misunderstood as a participatory process.” 213 Due process relies on
consultation and it is basically a tool to inform interested parties and get their
comments on IASB’s proposed standards. 214
Yet, informing and receiving comments does not mean the
commentators are fully participating in the standard setting process. The
IFRS Foundation Constitution states that the IASB has “complete
responsibility for all IASB technical matters including the preparation and

Case of the International Accounting Standards Board, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 217 (2011).
209
The most resent revision to the Handbook was approved by the Trustees on January 2013. IFRS
FOUNDATION, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK (2013), http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/Documents/2013/Due_
Process_Handbook_Resupply_28_Feb_2013_WEBSITE.pdf.
210
Interestingly, the once so much praised “due process” is now criticized by the ones who encouraged
the implementation of it at the global level. Former SEC Chair Cox, for instance, criticizes the IFRS “due
process” in his 2014 Speech arguing their “due process” is not beneficial for “American stakeholders” as
it is “global” and therefore, U.S. stakeholders are heard less. See Christopher Cox, President, Bingham
Consulting LLC, How America’s Participation in International Financial Reporting Standards Was Lost
(June 5, 2014), http://www.uscsecconference.com/assets/Keynote-Address-to-SEC-and%20FinancialReporting%20Institute-2014.pdf; see generally infra Part IV.
211
IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 209, § 1.7. (a) (“The formal due process procedures for the IASB
and its Interpretations Committee specify the minimum steps they must take to ensure that their activities
have benefited from a thorough and effective consultation process”).
212
Id. § 3.1.
213
BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 120.
214
IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 209, § 3.43, 3.44, 3.45.
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issuing of IFRS” and “full discretion in developing and pursuing its technical
agenda.” 215 In other words, the due process does not remove any authority
from the Board’s “full discretion” and “complete responsibility.” Instead, it
creates a reciprocal channel of communication–the Board informs the public
about the drafts and the commentators inform the board about their view.
This parallels the notice-and-comment procedure for administrative rulemaking in the United States. Although sending comment letters is not an
effective means to influence the draft standards, it is hard to identify a more
feasible alternative, and asking stakeholders for input before a standard is
drafted may be inefficient if not wasteful.
The consultation process starts only after a standard has been developed,
and the Board and the staff debate the issues before drafting a standard. 216
Research, discussion, drafting and revising is conducted by the “highly
skilled and capable technical staff.” 217 Since it is unlikely that comment
letters would influence the standard setting process after this point (unless
they raise issues or perspectives not previously considered), the IRFS seems
as though it is a portal disseminating drafts and preparing users for upcoming
changes, and in this way “legitimizing the standard setting”. 218 Therefore,
the due process in this context is not a tool to provide for public participation
in the standard setting process. That said, standard setting is a political
process. 219 As Botzem argues, lobbying starts long before due process and
most probably takes place where technical expertise is the most valuable
asset. 220
Third, a 2008 revision to the IFRS Foundation Constitution established
the Monitoring Board to improve accountability “by providing a formal link
between the Trustees and public authorities.” 221 Yet whether the Monitoring
Board improved accountability is open to debate. Until the creation of the
Monitoring Board, the IASB was criticized due to lack of accountability. A
Monitoring Board was created in 2009, with an aim to link the standard
setters to public authorities and overcome the accountability deficit while
protecting its “independent” structure. 222

215

IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 201, § 37.
BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 120.
217
Id. at 121.
218
Id. at 120–23 (According to Botzem, IFRSF laid out the due process in order to legitimize the
private standard setting).
219
Id. at 120–21.
220
Id. at 121.
221
IFRS Foundation, Monitoring Board, IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/MonitoringBoard.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
222
The intention to create such a board was declared in 2007 in a combined statement of several capital
market regulators including the SEC. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Authorities
216
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With the creation of the Monitoring Board, the IASB claims to have
public accountability. However, its powers are limited. Members of the
IASB are accountable to the Trustees who appoint them and can terminate
the appointment. 223 Trustees are selected in coordination with the Monitoring
Board, but removal of a Trustee is determined through a vote of the Trustees
themselves. 224 The Monitoring Board does not have power to terminate the
appointment of an IASB member or a Trustee. 225 Further, the Monitoring
Board “shall reach decisions to approve the appointment of Trustees and
establish any common positions by consensus.” 226 The effectiveness of the
Monitoring Board thus depends upon the “consensus” they need to reach. 227
According to the IFRS Foundation Constitution, accountability of the
Trustees is ensured by “their” commitment to act in the public interest,
“their” commitment to engage with the Monitoring Board, “their” review of
the entire structure of the IFRS Foundation, and “their” undertaking a review
every five years. 228 These provisions suggest that the Trustees are
accountable only to themselves. Personal accountability may well be an
ethical and psychosocial standard but it does not add much to the democratic
accountability deficit of the Foundation. The Foundation says they “provide
public accountability through the transparency of their work, the consultation
with the full range of interested parties in the standard-setting process, and
their formal accountability links to the public” 229 However, neither
consultation via due process nor the formal accountability link through the
Monitoring Board appear to enhance accountability to the Foundation as
desired. In addition, Foundation’s commitment to transparency and reviving
its constitution every five years strengthens the Foundation’s standing and
shows how “legitimacy is not a stable condition but ‘must be repeatedly

Responsible for Capital Market Regulation Work to Enhance the Governance of the IASC Foundation
(Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-226.htm.
223
IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 201, § 16. Termination can only be on the on grounds of poor
performance, misbehavior, incapacity or other failure to comply with contractual requirements.
224
Id. §§ 9, 14. Termination can only be on grounds of poor performance, misbehavior or incapacity
and a 75 per cent majority of all Trustees shall be required.
225
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS FOUNDATION (2014), http://www.ifrs.org/Theorganisation/Governance-and-accountability/Documents/Monitoring_Board_Mou_October-2014.PDF.
226
IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 201, § 23.
227
Id.; for a criticism of the consensus requirement see, for instance, BOTZEM, supra note 179, at 109
(sees the Monitoring Board more like a paper tiger).
228
IFRS FOUNDATION, supra note 201, § 17.
229
IFRS Foundation, Governance and Oversight, IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRSFoundation/Oversight/Pages/Oversight.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); IFRS Foundation, Glossary,
IFRS.ORG, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Pages/Glossary.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).

499

DOCUMENT4 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

9/18/17 1:50 PM

37:457 (2017)

created, recreated, and conquered.’” 230
C. Global Players and Pressure Towards Harmonization
A close examination of global players reveals how and why the world
switched to IFRS. Corporations with a desire to go global, stock exchanges
seeking to attract companies, and capital market investors played an
important role alongside international organizations such as the IMF, the
World Bank, and forums such as the G8 and the G20. While U.S.
involvement was instrumental to the rise of IFRS, pushing the world to adopt
an accounting standard similar to U.S. GAAP was not without self-interest.
In many countries, pressure to adopt IFRS originated with major
companies that wanted to be listed abroad and stock exchanges that tried to
attract them. By the 1990s, companies in developed economies such as
Germany pressured their governments to adopt or allow U.S. GAAP or IAS.
With the Asian financial crisis, the IMF and the World Bank added IFRS to
their political goals. Their efforts helped IFRS reach many small nations.
However, among these included nations without a stock exchange or a
publicly traded firm, who adopted IFRS to receive loans from the IMF. More
recently, G8 and G20 governments provided support. After the 2008
financial crisis, the G20 urged IASB and FASB to conclude the convergence
projects. 231
1. The Rise of Multinationals and Emerging Desire for Global
Standards
Using international or American accounting standards and support for
harmonization among multinationals is correlated to the increase in crossborder transactions. For instance, in the 1970s, cross-border transactions in
bonds and equities (also called “portfolio investments”) as a percentage of
GDP were as low as 4% and 5% in the United States and Germany

230
Sebastian Botzem & Leonhard Dobusch, Standardization Cycles: A Process Perspective on the
Formation and Diffusion of Transnational Standards, 33 ORG. STUD. 737, 742 (2012) (quoting KRISTINA
TAMM HALLSTRÖM & MAGNUS BOSTRÖM, TRANSNATIONAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER STANDARDIZATION:
ORGANIZING FRAGILE NON-STATE AUTHORITY 160 (2010)).
231
See LEADERS OF THE GROUP OF 20, DECLARATION OF THE SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2008), http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/declarationG20.pdf;
LEADERS OF THE GROUP OF 20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_
statement_250909.pdf.
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respectively; however, this number constantly increased since then. 232 It rose
to 35% in 1985, to 135% in 1995, to over 200% by the 2000s in the United
States. 233 As German companies increasingly invested abroad, portfolio
investments as a percentage of GDP rose to 33% by 1985, 172% by 1995,
and 483% in 2000s. 234 The percentages were higher in Italy, where portfolio
investments were 1% of GDP in 1975, but reached 253% by 1995 and 1126%
by the 2000s. 235
Unprecedented growth in cross-border capital transactions signaled a
move to harmonize accounting standards, yet continental European
governments did not adopt international standards in financial reporting until
the Daimler-Benz case. With the cross-listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE,
Continental European governments began to witness companies switch from
bank financing to capital market (stock exchange) financing; national
accounting laws no longer met the demands of a major firm that sought
alternative sources of capital. 236 For such firms, to switch to stock exchange
financing was reasonable as financing from European banks became more
limited.
At the same time, privatization emerged and increased demand for
capital–starting with the UK and spreading throughout the world. 237 From
1991 to 1996, assets totaling U.S. $370 billion switched hands from
governments to private investors. 238 The collapse of former socialist
countries also heightened competition for capital. 239 German banks, for
instance, were preoccupied with lending to companies from the former East
Germany following reunification in 1990. 240 The interest rates charged by
European banks became higher than the cost of stock exchange financing in
the United States. 241 For major firms not financed via banks, the only
alternatives were to raise capital in their national capital markets, or list their

232
BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 69TH ANNUAL REPORT 118 (1999); see also
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 194; SHIRIN RATHORE, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 6
(2008); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 118–19 (2001).
233
BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 232, at 118.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
See Perry & Nölke, supra note 53, at 579.
237
Richard A. Grasso, Globalization of Equity Markets, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1108, 1110 (1996).
238
Id. at 1110.
239
See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Living with U.S. Regulations: Complying with the Rules and Avoiding
Litigation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S152, S154 (1994).
240
Zeff, supra note 127, at 817–18. Many of those differences could not be eliminated to date. See,
e.g., Kate Connolly, German Reunification 25 Years On: How Different are East and West Really, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/german-reunification-25years-on-how-different-are-east-and-west-really.
241
Karmel, supra note 239, at S154–55.
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shares on another stock exchange. When Deutsche Telekom listed shares (in
Germany), over two million Germans bought the securities; when it listed
shares on the NYSE in 1996, it was the largest IPO in history. 242 Here, U.S.
stock exchanges were the most attractive but presented impediments for
foreign issuers that would potentially confuse investors, such as switching or
reconciling to U.S. GAAP (which is also expensive).
The Daimler-Benz cross-listing demonstrated that firms interested in
raising capital by way of cross-listing were eager to do so in the United
States; moreover, the ones that could reconcile to U.S. GAAP would do so.
Firms who did not want to deal with U.S. GAAP did not enter the U.S. capital
market in spite of meeting the listing requirements otherwise. For the EU this
meant that if a harmonized set of standards was not provided in the EU, U.S.
GAAP would likely become the global accounting standard. 243 In most cases,
large firms first prepared financial statements of their subsidiaries in
compliance with the national laws where the subsidiaries were located, then
creating entity-level and consolidated accounts under their respective
national laws, in addition to preparing additional financial or reconciliation
statements for the jurisdiction where they cross-listed. 244
But the surfeit of financial statements caused confusion. When DaimlerBenz listed on the NYSE, it had to reconcile financial statements prepared
pursuant to the German commercial code to U.S. GAAP. However, the 1993
financial statements of Daimler-Benz showed a profit of U.S. $354 million
under German commercial code, but a loss of U.S. $1 billion under the U.S.
GAAP. 245 Such a tremendous disparity contradicted the general belief that
profits would be lower in Continental European countries (mainly due to the
principal of conservative accounting) than in the United States or the UK. 246
Such incidents suggested that without elimination of such discrepancies,
investors would not know which statements to rely to inform their decisions.
At a time when people easily invested across borders and when
companies listed on multiple stock exchanges, both companies and investors
desired a common “passport” of global standards to ease comparison of

242

Richard A. Grasso, Globalization of Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 390, 392 (1997).
See, e.g., Perry & Nölke, supra note 53, at 579 (citing Ian P. Dewing & Peter O. Russell,
Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance of European Listed Countries: EU Policy Developments
Before and After Enron, 42(2) J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 289, 293–94 (2004)).
244
Berger, supra note 127, at 16–17.
245
James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1203
(1999).
246
Many researchers had found that profits figures would be consistently lower in France, Germany,
Netherlands, and Sweden compared to the United States or the UK as companies in those continental
European countries are more “conservative” or “pessimistic” especially in their inventory and
depreciation practices. See, e.g., NOBES & PARKER, supra note 107, at 43–44.
243
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financial statements. Harmonization of accounting standards sought to ease
comparability of financial reports and accelerate international access to
capital markets and investment opportunities. As companies sought global
access to capital markets, the discussion of accounting disparities forced
policy makers to consider the harmonization and international comparability
of financial reports. In turn, IFRS enabled public multinationals to use the
same financial statements no matter whether they listed in London, New
York or Hong Kong.
Stock exchanges with a desire to attract multinationals also persistently
tried to convince their governments to ease listing requirements for foreign
firms. The NYSE, for instance, pressured the SEC to ease accounting
requirements for foreign multinationals to list without reconciling to U.S.
GAAP. 247 “[T]here was an absolute rise in the German and Japanese market,
and the London Stock Exchange was outpacing Nasdaq and New York.” 248
Competition among stock exchanges was so fierce that SEC reports started
with a comparison between U.S. and international capital markets. A 1992
SEC report, for instance, included a comparison of the London Stock
Exchange in its second paragraph and emphasized that U.S. capital markets
were the largest and, while others markets were growing, they were not even
close. 249
Indeed, U.S. capital markets (and the NYSE primarily) were
experiencing “extraordinary growth” in trading volume and “becoming
increasingly global.” 250 In 1991, the trading volume of non-U.S. securities in
U.S. capital markets was U.S. $267 billion, and quadrupled to U.S. $1 trillion
by 1996. 251 Moreover, there were said to be over 2,500 foreign companies
that could list on NYSE. 252 Richard Grasso, the then-Chair & CEO of the

247
See generally Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of
Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S77 (1994) (explaining that the SEC was facing
pressure coming from the U.S. capital markets in addition to the foreign – mostly German – companies
and their governments and justifying the SEC’s response to such pressure); see also Martinez-Diaz, supra
note 1, at 3 (explaining how U.S. stock exchanges saw the existence of multiple accounting standards
around the world as a negative externality and lobbied their government toward harmonization).
248
CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra note 146, at 604 n.113 (citing their interview with then SEC Chief
Accountant Edmund Coulson on September 12, 2003).
249
DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS:
A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, at iv (1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf (“Today, more than 3,500 investment companies in the United States
hold over $1.5 trillion in assets on behalf of over 68 million accounts. To put that in perspective, the assets
of these investment companies are approximately 50% greater than the total value of all the stocks traded
in London, one of the world's largest capital markets.”).
250
Grasso, supra note 242, at 390.
251
Grasso, supra note 237, at 1114.
252
Jonathan Fuerbringer, World Markets; S.E.C. Says No on German Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26,
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NYSE, estimated that if only the top third of these eligible firms were added,
it would double the market value of NYSE. 253 If the state-owned entities soon
to be privatized were added, the numbers would get even higher. 254 To
increase market volume, the NYSE hired lobbyists to pressure Washington
and the SEC. 255 The Exchange got what it wanted in 1996 when the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act mandated the SEC to allow foreign
firms listed in the U.S. markets to use international accounting standards. 256
The SEC was not interested in country-specific treatments. It had not
given a “free pass,” even to Canadian firms listed in the United States, despite
that Canada had the largest number of companies listed in the United
States. 257 Canadian firms at one point amounted to more than half of the total
non-U.S. firms listed in the United States. 258 Even today, the countries with
the second and third largest number of listed companies in the United States
amount to less than Canada. 259 The SEC attitude did not change when U.S.
listings of the European countries peaked.
However, the SEC was continuously considering ways to ease the
process because an unprecedented number of foreign issuers were entering
the U.S. markets. 260 In 1993, more than a hundred foreign firms entered the
U.S. capital markets, raising the total number of foreign firms listed in the

1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/26/business/world-markets-sec-says-no-on-germanstocks.html; see also Grasso, supra note 237, at 1114 (according to Grasso, the number of foreign
companies that meet the NYSE listing requirement is 2,300).
253
Grasso, supra note 242, at 392.
254
Grasso, supra note 237, at 1114–15.
255
Martinez-Diaz, supra note 1, at 14.
256
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.
257
See infra Table 1.
258
SHAHROKH M. SAUDAGARAN & L. MURPHY SMITH, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING: A USER
PERSPECTIVE 2–61 (4th ed. 2013).
259
See infra Table 1. What is striking is the change in the top three nations with the highest number
of listed companies in the United States during this period. Up until 2006, Canada, the UK, and Israel
were the top three respectively. By 2007, the UK and Israel switched due to the increasing delistings of
the UK firms. British Airways, for instance, delisted in that time frame, together with Air France and
Bayer. In 2007, the Cayman Islands had more listed firms than the UK in the United States. Today, firms
from tax havens such as the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands find U.S. capital markets more
attractive while the number of European firms listed in the United States, including the ones from
Germany and the UK, continue to decrease. See, e.g., Serena Y. Shi, Comment, Dragon's House of Cards:
Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities Domiciled in the People's Republic of China and Listed in
the United States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265 (2014).
260
See, e.g., J. Carter Beese, Jr., Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The New Capital Order:
American Competitiveness and Global Capital Flows (Apr. 19, 1993), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
1993/041993beese.pdf; J. Carter Beese, Jr., Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keeping
America's Markets Competitive (May 25, 1993), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/
052593beese.pdf; J. Carter Beese, Jr., Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Market 2000 and the
Future of U.S. Capital Markets (Oct. 24, 1993), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/102493beese.pdf.
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United States to over 500. 261 “That is an average of two or three new
companies entering the United States for the first time every week.” 262 By
1998, the total number of foreign firms listed in the United States had
doubled, rising into the 1,100s. 263 The NYSE used complaints from these
firms, and prospective ones, to push the SEC. 264 The SEC first issued an
initiative to slightly ease the process for foreign issuers on November 3,
1993. 265
But for additional costs in financial reporting, multinationals—mostly
from continental Europe—were ready to cross-list in the United States. The
IASC worked around the clock to make the international standards ready and
available for companies to list in the United States. However, only with SEC
approval would multinationals be listed in the United States using a set of
standards other than U.S. GAAP.
Overall, there was hardly any discussion in the 1990s (at the SEC level)
on whether to adopt IFRS for domestic issuers and eliminate U.S. GAAP. To
the contrary, until allowing foreign issuers to use IFRS, the SEC faced
pressure to ease requirements for foreign issuers in order to keep U.S. capital
markets competitive. Clearly, SEC involvement ensured that accounting
standards for foreign issuers listing in U.S. capital markets were “equally
tough.” Even those who pushed international standards, such as the Chair of
NYSE, made it clear that international standards would not “abolish” U.S.
GAAP. 266 To the contrary, U.S. GAAP was serving well the millions of
Americans investing in the capital markets. Yet, international standards were
expected to “satisfy the needs of international investors” and “allow some
companies the opportunity to come to the United States.” 267 In 2007, the SEC
eliminated the reconciliation requirement for foreign issuers and gave them
the option to use financial statements prepared using IFRS.
2. Preferring an International Private Standard Setter Over UN
Research on international accounting standards often draws attention to
the character of the IASB as a private international standard-setter. What

261

See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 239, at S152.
See, e.g., Breeden, supra note 247, at S82–83.
263
International Registered and Reporting Companies, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml (last modified June 24, 2016).
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See, e.g., M. Shane Warbrick, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets: Significant
Issues and Hurdles from the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S112 (1994).
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Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to U.S. Markets, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S97, S103–10 (1994); Karmel, supra note 239, at S153.
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Grasso, supra note 237, at 1119–20.
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Id. at 1120.
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made the world prefer an international private organization over classical
international organization such as the UN? The UN was interested in setting
standards as multinationals 268 became more common and many nations grew
unsatisfied with the corresponding financial reporting requirements. 269 The
first UN Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and
Reporting (GEISAR) was created in 1976. 270 GEISAR soon converted into
an Ad Hoc Group 271 and later became ISAR. Throughout the course of these
changes, it became an observer, or perhaps a county-by-country reporter, but
never played a role in the standard-setting it was created for. Why was the
UN largely unsuccessful in positioning itself to set those standards for the
world?
Rahman’s excellent piece points out that developed countries are not
comfortable with the “sovereign equality” principle of the UN–where
developing countries get to say as much as developed ones–when it comes to
disclosure requirements of multinationals. 272 The UN Charter gives equal
voting rights to each member nation. 273 When there is a one-nation-one-vote
principle with decisions made by simple majority, it is logical to expect
smooth decision making so long as there is a majority. In the case of
GEISAR, developing countries were the majority. Developed nations held at
most 20% of the votes while the developing nations held about 75%. 274 Yet,
decision making was not smooth. 275
Multinationals were often based in developed countries, but invested in
developing ones. Different priorities and conflicting interests created tension

268

MNEs or Transnational Corporations (TNCs) as UN had called it then.
When a twenty-member group of eminent persons from diverse backgrounds across the world
prepared a report on MNEs as per the inquiry of the Economic and Social Counsel of the UN, they showed
that “there was a serious lack of financial and nonfinancial information necessary to effectively assess the
commercial and operating affairs of TNCs.” Rahman, supra note 141, at 599 (citing U.N. Dep’t of Econ.
and Soc. Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations, at 55, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1 (1974).
270
Rahman, supra note 141, at 599–601. After GEISAR an Ad Hoc Group was created in 1979 by the
resolution 1979/44. ISAR as today was formed in 1982 with the ECOSOC Resolution 1982/62 dated 27
Oct. 1982. In that Resolution, ECOSOC refers to the resolution 1979/44 setting out the terms of reference
for the former Ad Hoc ISAR. See Aggestam-Pontoppidan, supra note 141; NOBES & PARKER, supra note
107, at 98.
271
Not to be confused with the OECD Ad Hoc Committee of the OECD. OECD created, with a similar
name and task, an Ad Hoc Committee right after the UN got interested in setting accounting standards for
the MNEs.
272
Rahman, supra note 141, at 594, 603.
273
U.N. Charter art. 2. For UN, there is another step as there is a Security Council equipped with veto
power.
274
Rahman, supra note 141, at 595, 604 fig.2. The remaining 5 per cent of the votes belonged to the
socialist nations.
275
See generally, id. at 603–18.
269
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between them. Developed nations preferred comparable financial reports of
multinationals to better serve capital markets—harmonization was the motto.
Developing nations viewed corruption and the impact of multinationals on
economic development and political stabilization as a priority. The debate on
disclosure requirements of the multinationals became heated when a U.S.
Senate Subcommittee published a report confirming the involvement of a
major U.S. multinational in destabilizing Chile during the 1973 coup (where
Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected president Salvador
Allende). 276 Upon the publication of this report, a “comprehensive
investigation” of all activities of multinationals across national borders was
demanded. 277
Developing nations pressed to have more information about the
subsidiaries and affiliates of multinationals. As a result, GEISAR and others
recommended having “[s]eparate financial statements for the parent
company and for each individual subsidiary company to be published at each
subsidiary level, and not at the group headquarters level.” 278 The list of
disclosure recommendations (the Report) were unanimously adopted and
would have been implemented after ratification, but it failed to get approval
despite the absolute majority of supporters. Instead, GEISAR turned into an
Ad Hoc Group tasked with “reviewing” the Report and “formulating
priorities” rather than setting standards. 279 This effectively silenced the
developing nations’ attempts to have the UN set standards on accounting and
disclosure matters. After dissolution of the Ad Hoc Group, the developing
nations pressed for another group, but it was also tasked only with issuing
annual reports intended to review developments. 280
As this example shows, having a “majority” can be meaningless in a
“democratically constituted organization” such as the UN. In spite of a
general rule of decision-making by simple majority, in this case the minority
group sought unanimity to support implementation of the Report. 281 Without
support from developed nations, developing nations could not force
multinationals to comply with the requirements of the Report. The minority
group had additional leverage in that those nations could cut financial support
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Id. at 594–95, 618 n.3.
Id. at 595.
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Id. at 600 (including a list of the group’s unanimous recommendation as the minimum items of
disclosure for TNCs); see also U.N. Secretary-General, International Standards of Accounting and
Reporting for Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/33 (1977).
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See Rahman, supra note 141, at 600–01; see also Economic and Social Council Res. 1979/44 (May
11, 1979) (for the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group.
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Rahman, supra note 141, at 608.
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Id. at 615.
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to the UN, which would endanger the initiative. 282 The relatively powerless
majority had little choice but to adopt the unanimity requirement for
decision-making. 283 The unanimity requirement gave the power of the
majority to the minority–without the minority’s consent, the majority was
unable to make a decision. 284 A decision on disclosure requirements for
multinationals could not be made at the UN level thereafter, which gave the
standard setting seat to the IASC/IASB.
IV. UNITED STATES HESITANCE CONCERNING IFRS
After the SEC allowed foreign issuers to report using IFRS, discussions
started on whether they should allow the same option to U.S. issuers. In 2008,
the SEC published a Roadmap proposing the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers
beginning in 2014. 285 With this proposal, the SEC officially said that U.S.
issuers might use IFRS as early as 2014. At the time, SEC Chair Christopher
Cox openly and passionately supported international standards. For Cox,
pursuing this goal was important to fulfil the SEC’s mission of protecting
investors and facilitating capital formation at a time when two-thirds of U.S.
investors owned securities issued by foreign companies. 286
With the global financial crisis, the adoption of IFRS found its place in
the G20’s agenda. The G20 supported collaboration between the IASB and
FASB, urged them to conclude the convergence project by 2011 and to have
a single set of global standards in place.287 According to the Roadmap,
whether the United States would adopt IFRS would be decided by 2011. The
boards of the IASB and the FASB worked on convergence to eliminate
disparities. In 2011, the SEC postponed the decision to 2012 (and later, yet
again) to allow the two boards to work further. By 2014, U.S. issuers were
still not allowed to use IFRS and there was no SEC decision in sight. The
convergence project came to an end when the two boards declared to have
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Id.
Id.
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Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8982, Exchange Act Release
No. 58,960, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (Nov. 21, 2008).
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Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting
Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily (Aug. 27, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-184.htm.
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LEADERS OF THE GROUP OF 20, DECLARATION OF THE SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY (2008), http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/declarationG20.pdf;
LEADERS OF THE GROUP OF 20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_
leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
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different approaches in lease accounting. 288
The current situation is likely as far as IFRS can go in the United States.
The SEC has primarily been interested in international standards that foreign
companies could use instead of U.S. GAAP, and declared the possibility of
dropping the reconciliation requirement if international standards met U.S.
expectations. The possibility for U.S. issuers to adopt IFRS was discussed
only after the 2008 SEC Report when Christopher Cox was the Chair of the
SEC. 289 By asking for comments on this proposal, the SEC was trying to
evaluate whether there was such a demand. 290 Until the 2008 Report, there
was little evidence of an SEC intention to adopt IFRS for U.S. issuers.
However, Christopher Cox later indicated that IFRS would not be an
option for U.S. issuers. 291 At an event in June 2014, the former SEC Chair
indicated that “the SEC had not made any policy decision on whether to allow
IFRS to be used in the U.S. Nor had it developed any plan on how this would
occur if such a decision were to be made.” 292 Cox said, “everyone realized
the bride and groom would never wed.” 293 The possibility of a “wedding”
that was spelled out in his term in the Roadmap was null. The world’s leading
economy is, in Cox words, “without sufficient incentive or reward . . . to
abandon what it’s got.” 294
One can observe similar shifts among other SEC staff–though not as
blunt. SEC Chairs often chose to state commitment yet did little beyond such
statements. The SEC Chair White, for instance, said in 2014 that
“considering whether to further incorporate IFRS into the U.S. financial
reporting system has also been a priority . . . . And, it continues to be.” 295
Before her, Chair Schapiro said, they are “looking closely at the question of
incorporating IFRS into the financial reporting system for U.S. domestic
companies.” 296 But both hesitated to make a decision–neither allowing IFRS

288
David M. Katz, The Split Over Convergence: FASB and the IASB back away from the goal of a
single global accounting language, CFO.COM (Oct. 17, 2014), http://ww2.cfo.com/gaapifrs/2014/10/split-convergence/; Russell G. Golden, From The Chairman's Desk, FASB.ORG,
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPage&cid=1176
166231321 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
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See infra Part IV.
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Cox, supra note 245, at 9–10.
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 13.
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Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Financial Accounting Trustees
Dinner (May 20, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541872065.
296
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Financial
Accounting Foundation’s 2011 Annual Board of Trustees Dinner (May 24, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052411mls.htm.
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for U.S. issuers nor putting it off the table.
This hesitance is discernable at other levels of the SEC. For instance,
James Schnurr, the Chief Accountant of the SEC, stated that he would make
a recommendation to the SEC Chair within a couple of months (of starting
his duty at the SEC) and end the uncertainty investors are faced on this
matter. 297 Initially he proposed that the SEC give U.S. companies the option
to report to the SEC using IFRS. 298 However, Schnurr backed away from the
proposal within a couple of months because of lack of support for IFRS in
the United States, stating that “for the foreseeable future, continued
collaboration is the only realistic path.” 299 “Continued collaboration” or
“international collaboration” is often mentioned by other SEC members such
as Commissioner Kara Stein, yet, the vagueness of the expression only
creates uncertainty in spite of its positive character. 300 Despite claiming that
a recommendation on IFRS remains a “priority,” the SEC continues to
hesitate–neither taking it off the table nor deciding to allow usage.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I demonstrate how the IASB turned into the sole standard
setter of global accounting standards, and show how influential the United
States was in this process. In spite of pushing these standards internationally,
the United States does not allow U.S. listed companies to report using IFRS.
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James Schnurr, Chief Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
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mine to bring a recommendation to the Commission in the near future with the hope of resolving, or at
least lessening, this uncertainty.”).
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Michael Cohn, SEC Considers Supplemental Use of IFRS by US Companies, ACCT. TODAY (Dec.
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The United States neither openly rejected nor accepted adoption of IFRS, and
it looks like there will be no decision in the near future. Whether the United
States should adopt or allow IFRS for U.S. issuers has been debated, but
decision-makers in the United States nonetheless failed to reach an agreedupon next step. Rather than focusing on whether the United States should or
would adopt IFRS, I show that the push to adopt IFRS, initiated and promoted
by the United States, led the world to adopt Anglo-American accounting
standards at a time when such a global initiative was crucial for
multinationals. Although U.S. capital markets appear to have benefited most
from the initiative, the United States did not lead it so that U.S. issuers would
eventually adopt IFRS. Widespread adoption of a set of standards similar to
U.S. GAAP allowed the United States got what it wanted out of IFRS. A
rejection of IFRS by the SEC might endanger what has been achieved so far
and yet an adoption is not necessary. Hence the hesitance. 301
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U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, International Registered and Reporting Companies,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml
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